Optimal production strategy for auto manufacturers with government subsidies in competitive environments  

作　　者：Jingjing XUE Bin ZHENG Sijie LI 

机构地区：[1]School of Economics and Management,Nanjing Tech University,Nanjing 211816,China [2]School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China

出　　处：《Frontiers of Engineering Management》2024年第2期345-355,共11页工程管理前沿（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71871058 and 72271054);the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universitics(Grant No.2242023K40025).

摘　　要：Using the Hotelling model and evolutionary game theory,this paper studies the optimal production strategy of duopoly auto manufacturers and explores the impacts of two government policies(manufacturer and consumer subsidies)on strategies related to the production of electric vehicles(EVs)or fuel vehicles(FVs).The study finds that consumers’environmental preferences have direct effects on manufacturers’market shares and profits,which in turn,affect the manufacturers’production strategy selection.Specifically,when consumer environmental preference is sufficiently high,both auto manufacturers will eventually choose to produce EVs;when it is moderate,only one with a cost advantage will choose to produce EVs.Finally,when it is low,neither auto manufacturer will produce EVs.The findings further reveal that the more significant the difference in EV production costs is,the more inclined auto manufacturers are to choose a different final stable strategy.Regardless of whether the government subsidizes manufacturers or consumers,the policy only works if subsidies reach a certain threshold.The study also identifies the conditions under which government subsidies are considered more cost-effective.

关 键 词：supply chain management low-carbon emission electric vehicle SUBSIDY evolutionary game theory 

分 类 号：TN41[电子电信—微电子学与固体电子学] TP18[自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程]