数字技术嵌入视角下横向垄断协议宽大制度的经济学逻辑  

The Economic Logic of the Leniency Program of Horizontal Monopoly Agreements from the Perspective of Digital Technology

作　　者：许恒 Xu Heng(Business School,China University of Political Science and Law,Beijing 100088)

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学商学院,北京100088

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2024年第7期18-30,155,共14页Zhejiang Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“数字经济视角下垄断形成机制与反垄断规制研究”(22BJY116);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金中国政法大学科研创新项目“数字经济提升产业链供应链安全稳定的理论机制和实践路径研究”(21ZFQ79002)阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：数字技术加剧了经营者与监管者在技术层面和信息层面上的不对称,增加了监管者在识别和查证经营者合谋实施横向垄断协议这一过程中的成本。通过构建数理模型,本文发现:横向垄断协议宽大制度通过降低卡特尔成员退出并举报卡特尔的成本,弱化了卡特尔成员继续留在卡特尔内部的动机,缓解了监管者相较于经营者的数字技术劣势,达到了降低监管成本、提高监管效率和增加社会总福利的目的。此外,基于理论分析的结果,本文进一步探讨了在数字经济相关领域中,横向垄断协议宽大制度在监管前置中可能的实施方案以及针对性的调整路径,为避免卡特尔的形成提供理论基础。The use of digital technology strengthens the asymmetry between operators and regula‐tors about the monopoly agreements in terms of technology and information,raising the cost of identifi‐cation and verification by regulators.By constructing a mathematical model,this article finds that the le‐nient system of horizontal monopoly agreements weakens the motivation of cartel members to continue staying within the cartel by reducing the cost of cartel members exiting and reporting the cartel,allevi‐ates the disadvantage of regulators compared to operators in the digital technology layer,and achieves the goal of reducing regulatory costs,improving regulatory efficiency,and overall social welfare.In ad‐dition,based on the results of theoretical analysis,this article further explores the possible implementa‐tion plans and targeted adjustment paths of the leniency system of horizontal monopoly agreements in the pre cartel supervision process in the field of digital economy,providing a theoretical basis for the formation of early cartel constraints.

关 键 词：横向垄断协议 宽大制度 数字经济 监管前置 

分 类 号：D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]