押金返还制度下再制造闭环供应链的非合作-合作两型博弈模型  

Noncooperative-cooperative biform game models for remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under deposit-refund policy

作　　者：魏骊晓 李登峰 WEI Lixiao;LI Dengfeng(School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China)

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都611731

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2024年第4期283-301,共19页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72071032、72061007)。

摘　　要：针对两个制造商和一个回收商组成的再制造闭环供应链,本文构建了一个连续型非合作-合作两型博弈模型,研究制造商的定价策略及制造商与回收商的利润共享问题。本文首先在非合作博弈部分以制造商的销售价格为策略形成竞争局势,其次通过冯·诺伊曼方法确定合作博弈联盟的特征函数,利用Shapley值进行利润分配得到制造商和回收商的利润,然后将制造商分配得到的利润作为非合作博弈部分的支付函数,求解得到Nash均衡策略及最优利润。本文构建的非合作-合作两型博弈显著特点为非合作博弈部分局中人的策略为连续型且支付函数需要通过合作博弈部分确定,合作博弈部分局中人与非合作博弈部分的局中人不完全相同。本文通过对竞争模式、合作模式的对比分析说明了建立的非合作-合作两型博弈模型的合理性与有效性。最后,本文分析产品替代系数、回收难度系数和成本优势等参数对均衡定价策略及利润的影响,通过数值实例说明了政府收取制造商的单位押金对销售价格及利润的影响,为政府制定与实施押金返还制度提供合理建议。The rapid development of science and technology has accelerated the replacement of electronic products,and rapidly increased the amount of waste electrical and electronic equipment(WEEE)in China.The collection and remanufacturing of WEEE has become an important issue for the sustainable development of the country′s economy,environment and society.The deposit-refund policy implemented by government provides an effective way to encourage manufacturers to use waste products.In this paper,we construct a continuous noncooperative-cooperative biform game model for the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain that consists of two manufacturers and a collector under deposit-refund policy.We use it to study manufacturers′pricing strategy and profit-sharing between manufacturers and the collector.In the second part,a noncooperative-cooperative biform game model is constructed.First,the manufacturer′s sales prices are regarded as the strategies of players in non-cooperative game part,and any pricing strategy is seen as forming a competitive situation.Second,in referring to any competitive situation,we use the von Neumann method to optimize the buyback price and collection rate of waste products,which enables us to determine the characteristic function of coalitions in the cooperative game part.The Shapley value is then used to allocate the profits of the grand coalition,which makes it possible to obtain the profits of the manufacturer and collector.And the Nash equilibrium strategy of manufacturers is solved by taking the profit function allocated in the cooperative game part as the payoff function in the non-cooperative game part.Solving the noncooperative-cooperative biform game model established in this section enables us to simultaneously obtain the optimal strategies and profits of the closed-loop supply chain.In the third part,the equilibrium strategy,optimal profit and social welfare between supply chain members with only competition and only cooperation(i.e.,competition model and cooperation model)are discusse

关 键 词：闭环供应链 再制造 利润共享 非合作-合作两型博弈 押金返还制度 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]