“名债实股”的“罪”与“罚”——有限责任公司名债实股的问题与规制  

The“Sin”and“Punishment”of“Fake Debt,Real Equity”—The problem of“fake debt,real equity”in limited liability companies and regulation

作　　者：周骏 ZHOU Jun(Zhejiang Dongying Law Firm,Hangzhou 310020,Zhejiang,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江东鹰律师事务所,浙江杭州310020

出　　处：《贵阳学院学报（社会科学版）》2024年第3期104-110,共7页Journal of Guiyang University:Social Sciences

摘　　要：股东借款是有限责任公司的重要融资方式,这其中常存在“名债实股”的安排。因其自身特征,“名债实股”极易造成公司经营中产生严重过剩的风险偏好,并会导致这些风险外部化,继而损害社会层面的资源分配效率以及外部债权人的权益,因此有必要对其加以规制。借鉴美国、德国的现行制度,通过对债权重新定性制度、揭开公司面纱制度和股东债权劣后制度的系统整合,针对“名债实股”问题可建立起前置定性加后置兜底的特殊规制原则,并且结合国内现行法律和司法观点,为该规制原则在司法实践中寻求具体的适用路径。Shareholder loans are an important financing method for limited liability companies,and“fake debt,real equity”(FDRE)often exists within them.Due to its inherent characteristics,FDRE can easily lead to an excessive risk preference in the company’s operations and result in the externalization of these risks,thereby harming the efficiency of resource allocation at the societal level and the rights and interests of external creditors.Therefore,regulation is necessary.By drawing on the current systems in the United States and Germany,a special regulatory principle of preemptive characterization plus subsequent underpinning can be established for the issue of FDRE through a systematic integration of the regulations concerning the re-characterization of creditor’s rights,the lifting of the corporate veil,and the subordination of shareholder claims.In light of domestic current laws and judicial views,this paper proposes a specific application path for this regulatory principle in judicial practice.

关 键 词：名债实股 债权重新定性 股东债权劣后 衡平居次 

分 类 号：D923.3[政治法律—民商法学]