农村生活垃圾治理主体行为动态博弈研究——基于政府、农户的视角  

A Dynamic Game Study on the Subjective Behaviors in Rural Household Waste Management From the Perspective of Government and Rural Residents

作　　者：温宁 周慧 杨晓冉 WEN Ning;ZHOU Hui;YANG Xiaoran(School of Economics and Management,Luoyang Institute of Science and Technology,Luoyang 471023,China)

机构地区：[1]洛阳理工学院经济与管理学院,河南洛阳471023

出　　处：《洛阳理工学院学报（社会科学版）》2024年第4期41-45,共5页Journal of Luoyang Institute of Science and Technology：Social Science Edition

基　　金：河南省哲学社会科学规划项目“政府及农户双主体视角下河南农村生活垃圾治理机制研究”(编号:2022CJJ155)的阶段性成果.

摘　　要：农村生活垃圾治理涉及中央政府、地方政府与农户3个利益主体。通过建立动态博弈模型,分析农村垃圾治理参与主体的价值取向。模型均衡结果表明,实现治理目标与效益的可持续性,需要政府制定宏观良性政策,地方政府积极推进,保障农户获得预期收益,实现农户个体“利益最大化”。因此,政府在制度设计与政策安排上要尽可能纠正非理性行为选择,重点考虑正向示范作用以及适度的经济补偿。实行“自下而上的”模式,通过建立监督和长效激励机制,提高地方政府执行治理政策的积极性。Rural household waste management involves three stakeholders:the central government,local government,and farmers.This paper intends to do a research and analyze the value orientation of the subject involved by establishing a dynamic game model.The balance results of the model indicate that it needs government to formulate macro benign policies and local authorities to actively promote and ensure the farmers′expected profits in order to achieve the maximization of farmers′interests and sustainability of governance goals and benefits.Therefore,the government needs to focus on positive demonstration effects and moderate economic compensation in institutional design and policy arrangements,avoid irrational behavioral choices,follow a"bottom-up"governance model,and ensure the local governments′initiative in executing the policies through effective supervision and long-term incentive measures.

关 键 词：农村 生活垃圾治理 动态博弈模型 

分 类 号：X799.3[环境科学与工程—环境工程]