自动化决策拒绝权的属性、功能与限度  

Attributes,Functions and Limits of the Right to Refuse Automated Decision-Making

作　　者：李晓辉 Li Xiaohui

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学比较法学研究院

出　　处：《法学》2024年第7期15-30,共16页Law Science

摘　　要：自动化决策拒绝权作为个人信息权利的一种具体形式,是赋予数据主体在一定条件下拒绝自动化决策并要求人工干预下的二次决策的权利。在自动化决策广泛应用并暴露出现实风险的情况下,自动化决策拒绝权成为制衡算法权力的重要手段。欧盟《一般数据保护条例》机制并未对该权利发挥预期的规范效果。我国《个人信息保护法》确认了自动化决策拒绝权,应在明确该权利私法上形成权属性的基础上,强调其功能上的救济性和制衡性,将人工干预下的二次决策理解为一种实现程序正义的机制。自动化决策拒绝权的适用例外和结果导向划定了其作为算法正义矫正机制的限度。The right not to be subject to an automated decision-making,as a specific form of personal information rights,grants data subjects the right to refuse automated decision-making under certain conditions and require manual intervention for secondary decision-making.In situations where automated decision-making is widely used and real risks are exposed,this right becomes an important means of balancing algorithmic power.However,this right did not achieve the desired regulatory effect under the EU's General Data Protection Regulations mechanism.China's Personal Information Protection Law confirms this right.On the basis of clarifying the attribute of the right to form,the relief and balance of its functions should be emphasized.The second decision-making power under manual interventionis understood as a mechanism to recover procedural justice.At the same time,the result orientation and exceptions in the application of this right also define its limits as an algorithmic justice correction mechanism.

关 键 词：算法权力制衡 自动化决策拒绝权 《个人信息保护法》 《一般数据保护条例》 

分 类 号：D922.16[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]