政府激励机制下新能源技术发展三方演化博弈分析  

The Analysis of Tripartite Evolutionary Game of New Energy Technology Development Under the Government Incentive Mechanism

作　　者：周路遥 刘富州 袁博文 陆宇轩 吴天雄 ZHOU Lu-yao;LIU Fu-zhou;YUAN Bo-wen;LU Yu-xuan;WU Tian-xiong(State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co.,Ltd.Yancheng Power Supply Company,Yancheng 224000,China)

机构地区：[1]国网江苏省电力有限公司盐城供电分公司,江苏盐城224000

出　　处：《电工电气》2024年第7期1-10,共10页Electrotechnics Electric

摘　　要：伴随着参与电力市场的主体类型数量逐渐上升,经典的优化理论与常规博弈模型已经很难解决受多种因素影响的多主体行为决策模型。针对目前市场环境下新能源发电商与火力发电商的集中竞价行为,建立了竞争型代理模式下的三主体演化博弈模型。以参与博弈的主体有限理性以及市场化环境下有限信息,通过理论推导出了各主体在不同阶段、不同政策下的最优竞争策略,通过算例分析了发电商和政府部门的演化结果、策略应对以及其中影响决策的主要因素,验证了演化博弈在市场背景下多主体最优策略分析中的有效性,并为发电侧主体的行为和政府部门的政策提供了建议。With the gradual increase of the number of entities participating in the electricity market,it was difficult for classical optimization theory and classic game model to solve the multi-agent behavior decision-making model affected by multiple factors.In view of the centralized bidding behavior of new energy power generators and thermal power generators in the current market environment,a three-subject evolutionary game model under the competitive agency model was established.Based on the limited rationality of the subjects participating in the game and the limited information in the market-oriented environment,the optimal competition strategy of each subject in different stages and different policies were theoretically deduced.This paper analyzes the evolution results,strategic responses and the main factors affecting the decision-making of power generators and government departments through examples,it verifies the effectiveness of evolutionary game in the analysis of multi-agent optimal strategies in the market context,provides suggestions for the behavior of generation side and the policies of government departments.

关 键 词：发电竞价 发电侧 演化博弈 多群体策略均衡 

分 类 号：F206[经济管理—国民经济] TM61[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]