考虑同侧和跨侧网络效应的UGC平台广告投放和内容创作补贴策略  

Advertising and Content Producers’Subsidy Strategies for UGC Platforms Considering Same-Side and Cross-Side Network Effects

作　　者：李莉[1] 朱星圳 胡娇 张华[4] 何向 LI Li;ZHU Xingzhen;HU Jiao;ZHANG Hua;HE Xiang(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing 210094,China;Business School,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou 225127,Jiangsu,China;College of Economics and Management,China Three Gorges University,Yichang 443002,Hubei,China;School of Management Science and Engineering,Anhui University of Technology,Ma’anshan 243032,Anhui,China;College of Media and Art,Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Nanjing 210046,China)

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学经济管理学院,南京210094 [2]扬州大学商学院,江苏扬州225127 [3]三峡大学经济与管理学院,湖北宜昌443002 [4]安徽工业大学管理科学与工程学院,安徽马鞍山243032 [5]南京邮电大学传媒与艺术学院,南京210046

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2024年第4期865-877,共13页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771122)。

摘　　要：UGC平台连接着内容创作者和消费者,双边用户间存在的同侧和跨侧网络效应吸引着他们进入一个或多个平台,从而形成不同的部分多归属结构。基于Hotelling模型,通过构建UGC平台的竞争模型,研究了双方均单归属(SS)、仅消费者边部分多归属(MS)和仅内容创作者部分多归属(SM)3种部分多归属结构下同侧和跨侧网络效应影响下的平台广告投放与内容创作补贴决策,以及其对市场份额和平台利润的影响。研究发现:当消费者边单归属(SS或SM)时,平台的广告投放随同侧网络效应单调递减;当消费者边多归属(MS)时,平台的内容创作补贴和消费者规模会随同侧网络效应单调递增,而同侧网络效应对平台的广告投放水平的影响是非单调的,其受到消费者对广告厌恶水平的影响。当消费者边多归属(MS)时,随着消费者边的跨侧网络效应的增加,平台会采取提高广告投放水平和内容创作者补贴,即从消费者处获得更多的广告收入以补贴内容创作者的策略;而随着内容创作者边的跨侧网络效应的增加,平台会降低广告水平并提高内容创作者补贴,即采取同时向两边用户让利的策略。当内容创作者边多归属(SM)时,随着消费者边的跨侧网络效应的增加,平台会同时向两边用户让利;而随着内容创作者边的跨侧网络效应的增加,平台会降低广告投放和内容创作者补贴水平,即降低对内容创作者的补贴而让消费者观看更少的广告。当某一边用户选择多归属时,该边用户的规模会随跨侧网络效应的提升而增长。通过对不同情形下均衡结果的横向比较,还发现双边用户中存在多归属的前提是较强的跨侧网络效应,而内容创作者多归属时,平台更容易对内容创作者提供补贴。The user-generated content(UGC)platform connect content producers and consumers,and the same-side and cross-side network effects between bilateral users attract them to enter one or more platforms,resulting in different partial multi-attribution structures.Based on the Hotelling model,this paper investigates the advertising and content creator subsidy decisions of platforms under the influence of same-side and cross-side network effects under three partial multi-attribution structures and their effects on market shares and platform profits by constructing a competitive model of UGC platforms.It is found that when consumers belong to the same side(SS)or single-homing(SH),the ad placement on the platform decreases monotonically with the same-side network effect;when consumers belong to multiple sides(MS)or multi-homing(MH),the content creation subsidy and consumer size of the platform increase monotonically with the same-side network effect,which is non-monotonically affected by the level of consumer aversion to advertising.When the consumer side is MH,as the cross-side network effect on the consumer side increases,the platform will adopt the strategy of increasing the level of advertising and content creator subsidies,i.e.,to obtain more advertising revenue from consumers while subsidizing content producers;while as the cross-side network effect on the content producer side increases,the platform will reduce the level of advertising and increase content creator subsidies,i.e.,to adopt the strategy of conceding to users on both sides at the same.When the content producer side is MH,as the cross-side network effect on the consumer side increases,the platform will give out benefits to users on both sides;and as the cross-side network effect on the content creator side increases,the platform will reduce the ad placement and content producer supplementation level,i.e.,reduce the subsidy to content producers while allowing consumers to view fewer ads.When users on one side are more attributed,the size of users on that s

关 键 词：UGC平台 双边市场 网络效应 部分多归属 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济]