风险保障金与合作金融组织剩余控制权动态配置——基于SY资金互助社的案例研究  

Risk Guarantee Fund and Dynamic Allocation of Residual Control Rights in Cooperative Financial Organizations:A Case Study Based on SY Mutual Aid Society

作　　者：刘西川 杨梦瑶 Liu Xichuan;Yang Mengyao(College of Economics and Management,Huazhong Agricultural University)

机构地区：[1]华中农业大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《管理世界》2024年第7期157-174,203,共19页Journal of Management World

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“脱贫地区乡村振兴金融服务模式多元联结协同创新研究”(基金号:22BGL066);华中农业大学高层次人才启动费项目“加快建设中国特色农业金融市场体系研究”(编号:108/11042010017);2023年度华中农业大学自主科技创新基金项目“持续推进脱贫地区乡村振兴的金融支持研究”(项目批准号:2662023JGPY001)的资助。

摘　　要：不同于已有研究从静态视角出发探讨与构建合作金融组织剩余控制权配置制度,本文提出了一种新的剩余控制权动态配置假说。该假说认为,在合作金融组织初始股权结构基础上,发起人针对某笔具体贷款业务领投风险保障金,向小股东传递更强的发起人风险偏好与风控能力信号,强化发起人专有性投资并将剩余控制权配置给发起人的同时保护小股东的投资者利益,从而实现成员间能力、权利、风险与收益的动态最优配置。为验证该假说,本文构建一个合作金融组织剩余控制权动态配置分析框架,并在该框架下实证考察SY资金互助社及其所代表的领投型剩余控制权模式中发起人在初始股权结构的基础上,领投风险保障金在资金动员、资金运用与收益分配等环节中所发挥的作用及动态配置剩余控制权的内在机理。本文案例研究支持和验证了该假说的内在逻辑。进一步研究表明:领投型剩余控制权模式动态配置剩余控制权能够实现能力、权利、风险与收益的更优配置,这得益于风险保障金在调配上的灵活性和领投上的独享性。上述发现不仅为优化合作金融组织剩余控制权配置制度提供了新的思路,也为完善合作金融组织治理与监管机制指明了新的方向。Different from the existing research which explores and constructs the allocation system of residual control rights of cooperative financial organizations from a static perspective, this paper proposes a new hypothesis on the dynamic allocation of residual control rights. This hypothesis believes that, based on the initial equity structure of cooperative financial organizations, the initiators lead the risk guarantee fund for a specific loan business, sending stronger signals of the initiators' risk preferences and risk control capabilities to minority shareholders. This strengthens the initiators' proprietary investment and allocates the residual control rights to the initiators while protecting the interests of minority investors, thus achieving the dynamic optimal configuration of members' abilities, rights, risks, and returns.To verify this hypothesis, this paper constructs an analytical framework for the dynamic allocation of residual control rights within cooperative financial organizations. Empirical study under this framework examines on the role played by initiators in SY Mutual Aid Society and its representative lead-investment residual control model in the aspects of fund mobilization, fund utilization, and profit distribution, based on the initial equity structure. The case study in this paper supports and verifies the internal logic of the hypothesis. Further research indicates that the dynamic allocation of residual control rights in the lead-investment model can achieve a better allocation of abilities, rights,risks, and returns, which benefits from the flexibility in the allocation of the risk guarantee funds and the exclusivity of lead investment.The above findings not only offer new insights into optimizing the allocation systems of residual control rights in cooperative financial organizations, but also point out new directions for improving the governance and regulatory mechanisms of these organizations.

关 键 词：合作金融 成员异质性 剩余控制权 风险保障金 动态配置 

分 类 号：F832.35[经济管理—金融学]