去杠杆监管与企业合并范围异化——来自特殊合营安排的证据  

Deleveraging Regulation and the Abnormal Consolidation Scope of Enterprises: Evidence from the Special Joint Ventures and Associates

作　　者：张超 张新一 郑国坚[2,3] 张俊生[2,3] Zhang Chao;Zhang Xinyi;Zheng Guojian;Zhang Junsheng(School of Accounting,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics;School of Business,Sun Yat-sen University;Center for Accounting,Finance and Institutions,Sun Yat-sen University)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院 [2]中山大学管理学院 [3]中山大学现代会计与财务研究中心

出　　处：《管理世界》2024年第7期221-235,共15页Journal of Management World

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(基金号:72102243);国家自然科学基金面上项目(基金号:72372168);广州市基础与应用基础研究专题(基金号:2024A04J4543)的资助。

摘　　要：有效监管企业的杠杆风险是防范化解重大金融风险的微观基础。本文从“企业合并范围异化”的新视角揭示了一种全新的企业操纵账面杠杆率的手段——特殊合营安排,即上市公司将其持股高于50%的被投资主体认定为合营企业或联营企业,从而排除在自身合并范围之外(即不认定为子公司)。合营安排的认定使得被投资主体的负债无需被合并报表确认,同时资产上又能增加体现公司对该主体的股权投资,因此降低了合并报表的账面杠杆率。利用2015年去杠杆监管政策出台作为企业杠杆操纵动机的外生冲击,本文构建双重差分模型进行研究。实证发现:(1)去杠杆监管政策出台后,相比于政策出台前低杠杆率公司,高杠杆率公司(即操纵账面杠杆率下降的动机更强的公司)的特殊合营安排数量显著增加。同时,上述关系仅在政策出台后杠杆率下降的分组中成立,表明公司确实通过特殊合营安排迎合了去杠杆监管;(2)公司利用特殊合营安排操纵账面杠杆率的行为与集团负债模式、杠杆操纵动机强弱密切相关,具体表现为子公司杠杆对公司整体杠杆率影响更大、监管政策出台前公司杠杆率更高时,上述发现更为彰显;(3)公司迎合去杠杆监管的特殊合营安排更多来源于既有主体转换而非新设主体认定;(4)公司在杠杆操纵与真实降杠杆之间存在权衡,体现为越不具备真实降杠杆能力的公司,更倾向于通过特殊合营安排操纵账面杠杆率。此外,本文所有回归分析中均控制了已有文献所构造的杠杆操纵衡量,有力验证了本文所探讨的特殊合营安排是一种全新的杠杆操纵手段,且无法被已有衡量所测度。本文从合并范围异化视角拓展了杠杆操纵相关研究,也为监管机构与利益相关者充分评估企业杠杆风险提供了实践启示。Regulating corporate leverage risk effectively forms the micro-foundation for averting and mitigating significant financial risks.This paper reveals a novel perspective on manipulating leverage ratios by examining the abnormal consolidation scope:specifically,through special joint ventures and associates.In this arrangement,listed firms designate an investee holding more than 50%as a joint venture or associate(i.e.,out of the consolidation scope),rather than a subsidiary.By doing so,these firms exclude the liabilities of these invested entities from their consolidated financial statements while still reflecting the corresponding equity investments,ultimately lowering the leverage ratio in the consolidated financial statements.Utilizing the 2015 deleveraging regulation as an exogenous shock,this paper employs a difference-in-difference model to analyze its impact.The empirical findings are as follows.(1)After the deleveraging regulation was introduced,the number of special joint ventures and associates significantly increased in high-leverage firms(i.e.,firms with a stronger incentive to reduce the leverage ratio)compared to low-leverage firms before the regulation.This relationship only holds in the group whose leverage ratio decreased after the regulation,indicating that firms do cater to the deleveraging regulation through special joint ventures and associates.(2)The manipulation of leverage ratio through special joint ventures and associates is closely related to the group's debt model and the strength of leverage manipulation motives.Specifically,the findings are more pronounced when the influence of subsidiary leverage on the overall leverage ratio of the firm is greater,and the firm's leverage ratio was higher before the regulation introduction.(3)The creation of special joint ventures and associates primarily involves the conversion of existing entities rather than the establishment of new ones.(4)There is a trade-off between genuine deleveraging and leverage manipulation,with firms unable to reduce levera

关 键 词：企业合并范围 杠杆操纵 特殊合营安排 去杠杆 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F271F275