买卖合同中可预期利益司法评价的实证研究  

An Empirical Study on Judicial Evaluation of Anticipated Benefits in Sales Contracts

作　　者：王琳淳 王欣雨 Wang Linchun;Wang Xinyu(Shanghai University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 201701,China)

机构地区：[1]上海政法学院,上海201701

出　　处：《安徽冶金科技职业学院学报》2024年第2期62-63,66,共3页Journal of Anhui Vocational College of Metallurgy and Technology

摘　　要：目前司法实践中有关可预期利益的争议焦点转向如何确定具体赔偿数额。以买卖合同中的可预期利益为研究对象,通过类案分析的方法可以发现相关计算以完全赔偿与禁止双重获利为原则,遵循以可预见性与减损规则为代表的法定限制,同时存在着依当事人约定的例外情形。可预期利益计算的核心原则已经得到确立,以可预见性与减损规则为代表的法定限制规则也从合同法时代一脉相承。The focus of disputes over anticipated benefits in judicial practice has gradually turned to how to determine the specific amount of compensation,and the relevant rules and judicial interpretations of the Civil Code based on which this amount is determined are still too abstract to guide judicial decisions.Taking the expected benefit of the breach of the sale contract as the object of study,we can find that its calculation is based on the principle of full compensation and prohibition of double profit.

关 键 词：可预期利益 可预见性 减损规则 

分 类 号：D923[政治法律—民商法学]