企业刑事合规的法经济学分析  

Law and Economics Analysis of Enterprise Criminal Compliance

作　　者：张强[1] 叶婷[1] 代佳航 Zhang Qiang;Ye Ting;Dai Jiahang(Jilin University,Changchun Jilin 130015)

机构地区：[1]吉林大学,吉林长春130015

出　　处：《警学研究》2024年第3期29-37,共9页Police Science Research

基　　金：2023年度吉林省人民检察院检察理论研究课题“法经济学视角下网络平台企业数据安全刑事合规问题研究”阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：刑事合规作为企业犯罪治理的一项重要手段,已成为当下学界研究的重点。法经济学作为法学与经济学的交叉学科,为分析企业刑事合规相关问题提供了全新视角。依据法经济学相关理论,刑事合规是企业犯罪治理从非合作博弈模式到合作博弈模式转向的必要媒介。合作博弈模式下,通过成本收益分析方法的运用及模型构建,对影响企业进行事前刑事合规、事后刑事合规以及刑事合规最佳点的各类因素进行分析,进一步提出国家与企业双向互动的企业刑事合规优化路径。Criminal compliance is an important means of corporate crime governance and has become the focus of academic research.As an interdisciplinary subject of law and economics,it provides a new perspective for analyzing issues related to corporate criminal compliance.According to the theory of law and economics,criminal compliance is a necessary medium for the transformation of corporate crime governance from non-cooperative game mode to cooperative game mode.Under the cooperative game mode,through the application of cost-benefit analysis method and model construction,this paper analyzes various factors that affect the enterprise's criminal compliance before and after the event and the best point of criminal compliance,and further puts forward the optimization path of enterprise criminal compliance with two-way interaction between the country and the enterprise.

关 键 词：刑事合规 企业犯罪 法经济学 

分 类 号：D924.3[政治法律—刑法学]