管理层股权激励与债券投资者保护——基于债券契约条款设计的研究  

Management Equity Incentives and Bond Investor Protection:Based on the Design of Bond Covenants

作　　者：吴多文 张雪莹[2] 栗沛沛 WU Duowen;ZHANG Xueying;LI Peipei(School of Business,University of Jinan,Jinan250000,China;School of Finance,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan250000,China;School of Business,Southern University of Science and Technology,Shenzhen 518055,China)

机构地区：[1]济南大学商学院 [2]山东财经大学金融学院 [3]南方科技大学商学院

出　　处：《金融评论》2024年第3期110-130,157,158,共23页Chinese Review of Financial Studies

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金青年项目《债市违约潮与区域信用缩:形成机理、分化特征及修复路径》(项目批准号:21YJC790015);广东省教育厅特色创新项目(项目批准号:2023WTSCX078)的支持。

摘　　要：本文基于债券投资者保护视角,手工整理2010~2021年上市公司债券契约条款数据,探究了公司实施管理层股权激励对限制性债券契约条款使用的影响。研究发现,在实施管理层股权激励的公司中,限制性债券契约条款的使用增加,且股权激励强度越高,限制性债券契约条款的使用越多,这一现象对于限制资产转移类、限制投资类的债券契约条款的使用尤为明显。较高的大股东控制强化了管理层股权激励对债券契约条款使用的正向作用,良好的信息透明度缓解了股权激励对债券契约条款使用的正向作用。在管理层薪酬水平较高、股东与管理层合谋指数较高的公司中,实施管理层股权激励会增加限制性债券契约条款的使用。公司实施管理层股权激励,提升了企业的风险承担水平和大股东掏空水平,让债券契约条款的使用增加。本文的研究说明,债券投资者能够识别出管理层股权激励所带来的风险改变,并希望通过更完善的债券契约条款维护自身利益。This paper examines the impact of management equity incentives on the use of restrictive bond covenants from the perspective of bond investor protection.Utilizing manually organized data on bond covenant terms from listed companies between 2010 and 2021,our study reveals that the implementation of management equity incentives leads to an increased use of restrictive bond covenant clauses.Specifically,a higher intensity of equity incentives correlates with greater usage of covenants,particularly those restricting asset transfers and investments.The positive effect of management equity incentives on the use of bond covenants is amplified by higher levels of major shareholder control and mitigated by good information transparency.Additionally,companies with higher management remuneration levels and a higher shareholder-management collusion index exhibit increased usage of restrictive bond covenants.The implementation of management equity incentives prompts greater use of bond covenants by raising the company's risk-taking levels and the extent of shareholder expropriation.These findings indicate that bond investors can discern the risk changes induced by management equity incentives and seek to protect their interests through more comprehensive bond covenants.

关 键 词：管理层股权激励 债券投资者保护 债券契约条款 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]