盛名之累:冲突预期与联盟声誉的再调节  

The Burden of Good Reputation:Conflict Expectation and Remoderating Alliance Reputation

作　　者：李冲 Li Chong(Institute of World Economics and Politics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所,北京100732

出　　处：《世界经济与政治》2024年第7期96-124,155,156,共31页World Economics and Politics

基　　金：中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所课题项目“盟国声誉、联盟管理与冲突爆发”的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：国家在联盟中的声誉包括直接声誉和间接声誉。直接声誉来源于国家与特定盟友的历史互动,间接声誉来源于国家与第三方盟友的历史互动。直接声誉反映可靠性,国家的直接声誉越好、其履行联盟承诺的概率越大,盟友挑起冲突的意愿越强。间接声誉预示资源分配偏好,国家的间接声誉越好、其资源分配越向第三方盟友倾斜,特定盟友挑起冲突的意愿越弱。直接声誉和间接声誉会通过正反馈机制影响国家“被牵连”和“被抛弃”的风险,促使其主动调控声誉水平,采取措施约束或安抚盟友。间接声誉较好的国家为降低“被抛弃”的风险,可能维持对特定盟友的支持力度;直接声誉较好的国家为降低“被牵连”的风险,可能限制特定盟友使用武力。由于强国调配资源的自由度相对较大,因此其间接声誉对盟友挑起冲突意愿的抑制作用较弱。间接声誉好的国家与特定盟友利益分化程度较大,因此同时拥有良好直接声誉和间接声誉的国家约束盟友的动力更强。基于1816—2001年联盟声誉与冲突数据的统计检验和1961—1976年美韩同盟的案例检验可发现,国家追求的是适度而非最大化的联盟声誉。这一发现为国家联盟声誉的波动与盟友挑起冲突概率的变化提供了解释。States'reputation within an alliance encompasses both direct and indirect repu⁃tations.Direct reputation derives from states'historical interactions with specific allies,while indirect reputation stems from interactions with third⁃party allies.Direct reputation re⁃flects states'reliability.The better a state's direct reputation,the higher the probability of fulfilling alliance commitments,thereby increasing the ally's willingness to initiate conflicts.Indirect reputation signals states'preferences in resource allocation.The better a state's in⁃direct reputation,the more resources are likely to be allocated to third⁃party allies,thereby decreasing the specific ally's willingness to initiate conflicts.Both direct and indirect repu⁃tations influence states'risk of entrapment and abandonment through positive feedback mechanisms,prompting states to actively manage their reputations by taking measures to re⁃strain or assure allies.States with a better indirect reputation may maintain support for spe⁃cific allies to reduce the risk of abandonment,while those with a better direct reputation may limit specific allies'use of force to reduce the risk of entrapment.Given that major powers have greater freedom in resource allocation,the inhibitory effect of powers'indirect reputation on allies'conflict propensity is relatively lower.States with a good indirect repu⁃tation exhibit a higher degree of interest divergence with specific allies;thus,states posses⁃sing both good direct and indirect reputations are more motivated to restrain allies.Based on statistical tests of alliance reputation and conflict data from 1816 to 2001,as well as a case study of the US⁃ROK alliance from 1961 to 1976,it is evident that states pursue an opti⁃mal,rather than maximal level of alliance reputation.This finding explains the fluctuations in states'alliance reputations and the varying probability of allies initiating conflicts.

关 键 词：声誉 联盟困境 国际冲突 美韩同盟 联盟管理 

分 类 号：D815.5[政治法律—国际关系]