多主体对颠覆性技术采纳行为的动态演化及影响因素——基于演化博弈视角  

Dynamic Evolution and Influencing Factors of Multi-Agent Adoption Behavior of Disruptive Technologies:An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

作　　者：张光宇[1,2] 张安俊 曹阳春 Zhang Guangyu;Zhang Anjun;Cao Yangchun(School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou 510520,China;Innovation Theory and Innovation Management Research Center,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou 510520,China;School of Management,Guangdong Ocean University,Zhanjiang 524088,China)

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520 [2]广东工业大学创新理论与创新管理研究中心,广东广州510520 [3]广东海洋大学管理学院,广东湛江524088

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2024年第13期63-70,共8页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“颠覆性创新的技术演进特征与市场扩散路径研究:价值创造视角”(72074056);国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目“技术标准联盟网络对战略性新兴产业主导设计形成的影响机理研究”(72004036);广东海洋大学科研启动经费项目“基于多层次视角下的颠覆性技术多元化投入机制研究”(060302092301)。

摘　　要：以参与方有限理性和信息不完全为前提,构建以企业、消费者与政府为核心主体对于颠覆性技术采纳行为的演化博弈模型,从而分析三方对于颠覆性技术采纳的稳定策略,并通过MATLAB进行数值仿真模拟,分析验证该模型具体的演化路径,从而探究三方在颠覆性技术采纳行为博弈过程中决定双方最终策略选择的影响因素。结果表明:(1)企业、消费者与政府等三方主体对颠覆性技术产品的初始态度与接纳倾向会影响的博弈系统的演化路径与结果。(2)对于颠覆性技术企业而言,更高的颠覆性技术产品生产占比有助于缩短颠覆性技术采纳周期,并能提高政府对企业提供扶持的期望;对于政府而言,政府对生产颠覆性技术产品的企业补贴将延长技术采纳周期,同时若政府对生产颠覆性技术产品的企业补贴力度过大将会使政府最终放弃补贴,而政府对购买颠覆性技术产品的消费者补助则在技术采纳过程的前中期进行补助效果明显优于后期补助的效果。Based on the premises of bounded rationality and incomplete information,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model focusing on the adoption behavior of disruptive technologies by enterprises,consumers,and governments as the core agents.The model is used to analyze the stable strategies of the three parties in adopting disruptive technologies.Numerical simulation and verification of the model's specific evolutionary paths are conducted using MATLAB to explore the factors influencing the final strategy choices of the parties in the game process of adopting disruptive technologies.The results indicate that:(1)The initial attitudes and acceptance tendencies of enterprises,consumers,and governments towards disruptive technology products influence the evolutionary path and outcome of the game system;(2)For enterprises,a higher production proportion of disruptive technology products helps shorten the adoption cycle of disruptive technologies and increases the government's expectation of supporting the enterprises.For the government,subsidies for enterprises producing disruptive technology products extend the adoption cycle.If the subsidy is too large,the government may eventually abandon the subsidy.However,subsidies for consumers purchasing disruptive technology products show more significant effects in the early and middle stages of the adoption process compared to subsidies provided in the later stages.

关 键 词：颠覆性创新 演化博弈 技术采纳 多群体 

分 类 号：F406.3[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32[文化科学] G301