商业数字平台租金、垄断规制与个人消费数据确权——一个基于政治经济学的双边市场模型  

Commercial Digital Platform Rent,Antitrust Regulation and Personal Consumption Data Ownership:A Two-sided Market Model Based on Political Economy

作　　者：乔晓楠[1,2] 冯天异 瞿王城 QIAO Xiao-nan;FENG Tian-yi;QU Wang-cheng(School of Economics,Nankai University;Center for Studies of Political Economy,Nankai University)

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院 [2]南开大学政治经济学研究中心

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2024年第6期117-135,共19页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“劳动力要素市场化配置中的效率增进与协同推进共同富裕路径研究”(批准号22&ZD055);国家社会科学基金一般项目“新时代贸易强国建设的政治经济学研究”(批准号20BJL046);教育部哲学社会科学研究专项(党的二十大精神研究)“全体人民共同富裕实现路径研究”(批准号23JD20103)。

摘　　要：本文基于政治经济学原理,针对个人消费数据所有权属于商业数字平台和消费者(劳动者)个人两种情况,区分竞争、寡头垄断、完全垄断三种市场结构,构建体现双边市场特征的数理模型,讨论商业数字平台利润与租金的性质及其对社会再生产的影响,进而为商业数字平台垄断规制与个人消费数据确权提供原则性建议。研究发现:①商业数字平台所实现的流通效率与平均利润率提升是生产部门使用平台服务的前提,级差租金是一种基于流通效率改进的超额利润转移机制,垄断租金则是一种基于垄断地位与权力的平均利润转移机制,因此,平台规制可以允许级差租金存在,但应限制垄断租金收取,避免平台过度挤压平均利润。②个人消费数据的确权应当在促进社会再生产持续稳定运行的前提下兼顾流通效率提升与个人隐私保护。由于数据确权可以改变平台与消费者之间的分配关系以及总需求的规模及结构,可以结合特定时期“工资主导型经济”或“利润主导型经济”的特征来考虑数据确权的分配倾向。③平台规制的缺失将导致平台通过收取垄断租金转移向消费者支付的数据使用费,使得数据确权所形成的收益分配机制在实质上失效,因此应当统筹设计平台规制与数据确权。本文的研究有助于厘清商业数字平台不同性质的收益在社会再生产中的影响,为完善商业数字平台的监管以及优化个人消费数据的确权提供了政策启示。Commercial digital platforms(CDPs)use digital technologies to significantly accelerate capital circulation and turnover.However,the possession of data by CDPs can lead to monopolistic and unfair competition,necessitating in-depth research on the antitrust regulation of CDPs.The data utilized by CDPs is generated from personal consumption behaviors and involves personal privacy.Therefore,how to confirm the ownership of personal consumption data requires further exploration.Based on the principles of political economics,this paper constructs a mathematical model reflecting the characteristics of a two-sided market to analyze the implications of personal consumption data ownership under two scenarios:ownership by CDPs and ownership by consumers(workers).The model distinguishes three market structures:competition,oligopoly,and monopoly,and then investigates the nature of profits and rents generated by CDPs and their impact on social reproduction.Research findings are as follows.Firstly,improving the circulation efficiency and average profit rate achieved by CDPs is the prerequisite for production sectors to use their services.Differential rent is a mechanism for transferring excess profits based on enhanced circulation efficiency,while monopoly rent is for transferring average profits based on monopoly position and power.Secondly,the ownership of personal consumption data can alter social distribution relationships and the scale and structure of total demand.In a wage-led economy,assigning data ownership to individuals is more conducive to social reproduction,whereas,in a profit-led economy,assigning data ownership to CDPs is more beneficial.Thirdly,the lack of antitrust regulation for CDPs can undermine the revenue distribution effects of personal consumption data ownership,which enables these platforms to collect monopoly rent,potentially distorting the valuation of data elements and allowing them to recoup the data usage fees paid to consumers.This paper provides suggestions for antitrust regulation and data owner

关 键 词：商业数字平台租金 垄断规制 个人消费数据确权 双边市场 

分 类 号：F262[经济管理—国民经济]