政府参与下制造企业物流服务创新演化博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Logistics Service Innovation and Evolution of Manufacturing Enterprises with Government Participation

作　　者：许嘉宁 XU Jianing(Zhejiang WanLi University,Ningbo 315100,Zhejiang,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江万里学院,浙江宁波315100

出　　处：《科技和产业》2024年第14期50-56,共7页Science Technology and Industry

摘　　要：在经济快速发展的今天,人们对于物流的要求越来越高。通过构建政府与物流企业的演化博弈模型,研究二者协同进化的均衡机制,并通过Matlab进行模拟验证。结果显示,中国制造业企业开展物流服务创新的主要原因在于其所获得的收入与费用,因此通过对企业的政策鼓励,可以有效地推动其开展物流服务创新。在此基础上,针对中国制造企业的发展现状,提出了强化政府激励和推动物流服务发展的对策。In today’s rapid economic development,people’s demand for logistics is getting higher and higher.Through constructing the evolutionary game model of government and manufacturing enterprise,the equilibrium mechanism of co-evolution was studied and verified by Matlab.The result shows that the main reason of logistics service innovation in manufacturing enterprises lies in their income and expenses.On this basis,the policy encouragement can effectively promote the innovation.In view of the current situation of our country’s manufacturing enterprises,some countermeasures are put forward to strengthen the government incentive and promote the development of logistics services.

关 键 词：制造企业 物流服务创新 政府激励 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济] F425