经理的扩权现实与公司法因应  

The Reality of Expansion of Manager’s Powers and Responses in Company Law

作　　者：叶林[1] 钱程 YE Lin;QIAN Cheng

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学法学院

出　　处：《经贸法律评论》2024年第4期24-46,共23页Business and Economic Law Review

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“法治化营商环境建设法律问题研究”(项目批准号:22JJD820018)。

摘　　要：法律规范与社会实践之间始终存在张力。新《公司法》显示出立法者弱化经理职权的倾向,然而,经理在我国公司治理中则呈现出明显的权力扩张现象。这种现象与美国“经理中心主义”的背景存在不同,在我国具有特殊成因。基于产权划分的治理模式深刻影响到现代经理的权威塑造,“谁投资谁所有”的内在逻辑形成了经理扩权的外在表象,而《公司法》事实上赋予了经理作为公司信息汇集节点的地位,变相地推动了经理扩权。在此背景下,应当正视经理权力扩张对公司治理造成的潜在风险,并对其采取妥当的规制立场。新《公司法》对于经理职权和地位的规范无助于消弭风险,强制性的安排难以适应现代公司治理的多元现实,因而需要对经理扩权的现象采取特殊监管措施。对此,域外主要采用两种类型的规制方法。显性方法是约束董事长兼任经理的现象,缓和公司内过高的权力集中度。但这种方法过于刚性,难以适应复杂的公司实践。隐性方法是细化经理的信义义务,通过报告义务、服从指示和勤勉义务等内容的具体配置,使经理处于董事会的领导下。该方法旨在解决董事会与经理的代理成本问题,更为灵活、具有适应性,适宜我国采纳。There is always a tension between legal norms and social practices.The new Company Law(CL)contains the tendency of the legislator to weaken the authority of the manager,while the manager in China’s corporate governance shows a clear phenomenon of power expansion.This phenomenon is different from the background of“CEO-primacy”in the United States,which has its special causes in China.The governance model based on the division of property rights has a profound impact on the modern manager’s authority,and the internal logic of“who invests who owns”forms the external appearance of the manager’s power,while CL in fact grants the manager status as a node of the company’s information collection at the same time,which faciliates the expansion of the manager’s power.However,the potential risks of managerial power expansion should be squarely addressed and a proper regulatory stance should be taken.Provisions in CL on the manager’s authority and status cannot help to eliminate the risk,and the mandatory arrangement is difficult to adapt to the pluralistic reality of modern corporate governance.Therefore,it’s necessary to adopt special regulatory measures for the phenomenon.In this regard,two types of regulatory methods are mainly adopted overseas.The explicit approach is to restrain CEO duality in which chairman of the board of directors also serves as a manager,so as to moderate the excessive concentration of power in the company.However,this approach is too rigid and difficult with regard to complex corporate practices.The implicit approach is to refine the manager’s fiduciary duties,placing the manager under the leadership of the board of directors through specific configurations of duties of reporting,obedience to instructions and duty of care.This method aims to solve the agency problem between the board of directors and the manager,and is more flexible and adaptable,which is suitable for China.

关 键 词：经理 权力扩张 董事长兼任经理 经理义务 

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