政府干预视角下装配式混凝土建筑发展演化博弈研究  

Research on the Development and Evolution Game of Prefabricated Concrete Buildings from the Perspective of Government Intervention

作　　者：申琪玉[1] 陈群辉 SHEN Qiyu;CHEN Qunhui(School of Civil Engineering and Transportation,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学土木与交通学院,广东广州510641

出　　处：《建筑经济》2024年第S01期391-396,共6页Construction Economy

摘　　要：我国装配式混凝土建筑发展处于初期阶段,开发商等相关方的参与意愿不高。本文基于政府干预视角,引入政策规制因子和技术进步因子,建立政府、构件生产商和开发商的三方演化博弈模型,利用实际项目数据进行数值仿真,探究政府补贴系数、罚款系数、构件生产商收益提高系数和开发商增量成本降低系数等关键参数对博弈主体行为演化的影响,并求得关键参数的理想区间,最后提出合理分配补贴比例、实行奖惩并举和推动技术进步等政策建议。The development of prefabricated concrete construction in China is in the early stage,and the willingness of developers and other relevant parties to participate is not high.Based on the perspective of government intervention,this paper introduces policy regulation factors and technological progress factors,establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model of government,component manufacturers and developers,and conducts numerical simulation with actual project data,to explore the influence of key parameters such as government subsidy coefficient,penalty coefficient,component manufacturers'revenue improvement coefficient and developers'incremental cost reduction coefficient on the behavior evolution of game players,and obtains the ideal interval of key parameters.Finally,it puts forward policy suggestions such as reasonable allocation of subsidy ratio,implementing both rewards and punishments and promoting technological progress.

关 键 词：装配式混凝土建筑 政策激励 演化博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：TU741[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]