财政分权、政府竞争和劳动收入份额--来自“省直管县”改革的证据  

Fiscal Decentralization,Government Competition,and Labor Income Share:Evidence from the“Province Managing Counties”Reform

作　　者：张明昂 尹俊烨 罗宇 Zhang Ming-ang;Yin Junye;Luo Yu(School of Public Finance and Taxation,Central University of Finance and Economics;School of Public Finance and Taxation,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学财政税务学院 [2]西南财经大学财政税务学院

出　　处：《经济科学》2024年第4期44-67,共24页Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“信息完备性、婚姻匹配与子代人口质量研究”(项目编号:72203247);国家社科基金重大项目“实质性减税降费与经济高质量发展”(项目编号:19ZDA070)的资助。

摘　　要：在进一步推进省以下财政体制改革和聚焦共同富裕的发展背景下,如何通过更好的财政机制有效实现居民收入增长和劳动报酬提高已经成为一个重要议题。本文利用中国工业企业数据和县域数据,运用双重差分方法,以“省直管县”改革为准实验,研究财政分权对企业劳动收入份额的影响。研究发现,“省直管县”财政体制改革显著降低了县域内企业劳动收入份额,其引致的税收竞争和财政支出竞争扭曲了地方政府税收征管和财政支出行为,进而导致企业避税增加和融资约束加剧,对劳动收入份额产生负面影响。In the context of further advancing fiscal system reform below the provincial level and promoting common prosperity,improving resident income and labor compensation through better fiscal mechanisms has become an important topic This paper examines the impact of the“province managing counties”(PMC)reform,a form of fiscal decentralization,using data from China's industrial enterprises and countylevel statistics By employing a staggered differenceindifferences(DID)model,this paper investigates how this reform affects the share of labor income within enterprises The empirical results show that the PMC fiscal system reform significantly reduces the share of labor income within local enterprises Further analysis reveals that the PMC reform increase local government decentralization,leading to distorted tax enforcement and fiscal expenditure competition among local governments This,in turn,increases tax avoidance by enterprises and worsen financing constraints,resulting in a negative impact on the share of labor income within enterprises.

关 键 词：财政体制改革 省直管县 政府竞争 劳动收入份额 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学] F241.2