基于Stackelberg博弈的电动汽车充电管理策略  

CHARGING MANAGEMENT STRATEGY OF ELECTRIC VEHICLE BASED ON STACKELBERG GAME

作　　者：徐蕙 陈平[1] 李香龙[1] 王培祎 马龙飞[1] Xu Hui;Chen Ping;Li Xianglong;Wang Peiyi;Ma Longfei(State Grid Beijing Electric Power Company,Beijing 100031,China)

机构地区：[1]国网北京市电力公司,北京100031

出　　处：《计算机应用与软件》2024年第8期382-388,共7页Computer Applications and Software

基　　金：国家电网公司科技项目(52020119000C)。

摘　　要：电动汽车的充电效率和充电成本是电动汽车电源管理的重要问题,也是影响电动汽车推广的关键因素。对此,提出一种基于Stackelberg博弈模型的收费控制策略。在博弈中,电网、零售商和用户都参与决策,充电策略可以灵活地满足电网、零售商和用户的不同需求,采用逆归纳法得到博弈模型的均衡解。通过仿真、无序充电过程和基于静态分时电价的充电控制方法对其效益进行比较,分析博弈模型中参数对收费过程的影响,验证了该方法的有效性。Charging efficiency and charging cost of electric vehicles(EVs)are important issues in power management of EVs,which are key factors affecting the promotion of EVs.This paper proposes a charging control strategy based on Stackelberg game model.In the game,the grid,retailers and users were involved in the decision-making,and the charging strategy could flexibly meet the different demands of the grid,retailers and users,and the equilibrium solution of the game model was obtained by using the inverse induction method.The effectiveness of the method was verified by comparing its benefits through simulation,disordered charging process and charging control method based on static time-sharing tariff,and analyzing the influence of parameters in the game model on the charging process.

关 键 词：STACKELBERG博弈 电动汽车 博弈均衡 充电管理策略 

分 类 号：TP3[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]