德雷福斯技能习得模型的断裂及其弥合——兼论人工智能与人类智能的关系问题  

The Rupture and Reconciliation of the Model of Skill Acquisition:On the Relationship Between Artificial Intelligence and Human Intelligence

作　　者：程瑞[1] 伏其秦 CHENG Rui;FU Qiqin

机构地区：[1]山西大学科学技术哲学研究中心

出　　处：《哲学分析》2024年第4期17-31,196,共16页Philosophical Analysis

摘　　要：德雷福斯在批判人类智能的认知主义模型的基础上,提出了其著名的技能习得模型,并在表征意向性之外增加了运动意向性的预设。他主张“表征意向性以运动意向性为基础”,并以此指导其人工智能哲学观。但在技能习得模型中,表征意向性与运动意向性之间存在根本的断裂,导致德雷福斯的技能习得模型面临内在的矛盾。这种矛盾源于德雷福斯坚持一种海德格尔式的类人人工智能理解。通过反思与悬搁这一人工智能理解,可以重新澄清表征意向性与运动意向性的关系,弥合技能习得模型中的断裂,并有助于揭示一种对人工智能与人类智能关系的新理解。德雷福斯与技能习得模型的技术哲学意义与这种新的关系理解息息相关。Dreyfus proposed his famous model of skill acquisition based on a critique of the cognitivist model of human intelligence and added the presupposition of motor intentionality to representational intentionality.Dreyfus asserts that“representational intentionality is based in motor intentionality”and this guides his philosophical view of artificial intelligence.However,in the model of skill acquisition,there is a fundamental rupture between representational intentionality and motor intentionality,leading to an inherent contradiction in Dreyfus’s model of skill acquisition.This contradiction stems from Dreyfus’s insistence on a Heideggerian understanding of human-like artificial intelligence.By reflecting on and suspending this understanding of AI,the relationship between representational intentionality and motor intentionality can be clarified to reconcile the rupture in the model of skill acquisition and helping to reveal a new understanding of the relationship between AI and human intelligence.The techno-philosophical significance of Dreyfus and the model of skill acquisition are relevant to this new relational understanding.

关 键 词：表征意向性 运动意向性 认知主义模型 技能习得模型 人工智能 

分 类 号：B15[哲学宗教—世界哲学]