债务纾困与地方政府道德风险  

Debt Relief and Moral Hazard of Local Governments

作　　者：李一花[1] 李林巍 LI Yihua;LI Linwei(School of Economics,Shandong University;Institute of State Governance,Shandong University)

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院,山东济南250100 [2]山东大学国家治理研究院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《金融研究》2024年第3期38-55,共18页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：债务置换是把“双刃剑”,在纾困地方政府到期债务压力的同时,极易强化地方政府的道德风险。本文采用相对估计法和虚拟变量法,科学测度地方融资平台过度负债水平(地方政府道德风险),并利用依申请公开的241个城市2015-2018年置换债券数据,实证研究债务置换对地方政府道德风险的影响及其经济后果。研究发现:第一,地方融资平台的资产负债率比一般企业高7.2个百分点,利息覆盖率是一般企业的61.43%,2014年后地方融资平台过度负债水平不降反升。第二,债务置换导致融资平台过度负债水平上升,尤其是短期负债风险更加严重。第三,地方政府道德风险的变化显著受到地区经济发展水平、新增专项债券规模(效率)和政府担保资源的影响。第四,债务置换通过提升融资平台过度负债水平,对地方财政可持续性产生负面影响。本文为总结债务置换经验教训、深化地方政府债务管理提供了新的经验证据,可为建立防范化解地方债务风险长效机制提供政策启示。Since 2015,Chinese local governments plan to issue replacement bonds to replace the financing platform debt that governments have to repay at maturity.By issuing local replacement bonds,local governments can reduce interest burden,optimize term structure,and free up more funds for key project construction.However,debt replacement is a double-edged sword,and the central government's debt relief can easily deepen moral hazard of local governments.Debt replacement reflects the central government's policy intention to bail out local government debt so that local governments have an expectation that when they encounter debt difficulties,the central government will provide assistance,thus relaxing budget constraints and leading to increased financing platform debt.Since 2015,the implicit debt of local governments has been replaced,added,and re-replaced.Does it show that the moral hazard of local government debt is difficult to eliminate?Does debt replacement strengthen the rescue expectation of local governments,thereby having a negative impact on the moral hazard of local government debts?What impact does financing platforms over-indebtedness have on the sustainability of local finance in the context of tight fiscal balance?To explore these issues,this paper first collates the financial data of local financing platforms from 2010 to 2019,uses two debt level indicators of asset-liability ratio and interest coverage,and uses relative estimation method and dummy variable method to measure the degree of over-indebtedness financing platforms.On this basis,with the help of the 2015-2018 prefecture-level replacement bond dataset manually collected by the author,empirical research is conducted on the impact of debt replacement on the over-indebtedness of financing platforms.The main conclusions are as follows:Firstly,the measurement result of financing platform over-indebtedness shows that the asset-liability ratio of financing plaforms exceeds 7.20%of that of the general enterprises,and the interest coverage rate is only 61.

关 键 词：债务纾困 债务置换 地方政府道德风险 融资平台过度负债 相对估计法 

分 类 号：D648[政治法律—政治学] D630[政治法律—中外政治制度] F812.5[经济管理—财政学]