土地经营权入股的隐性失地风险与制度应对  

The Recessive Risk of Land Loss and Its Institutional Response in the Land Management Right Investment

作　　者：谭贵华[1] TAN Guihua(Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing 401120,China)

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学,重庆401120

出　　处：《西南政法大学学报》2024年第4期80-92,共13页Journal of Southwest University of Political Science and Law

基　　金：重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学研究基地项目“农村集体经济组织促进共同富裕实现机制研究”(23SKJD007)。

摘　　要：担心失地是制约土地经营权入股的重要因素。基于制度文本和实践纠纷的解析,土地经营权入股的失地风险主要为隐性失地风险——虽然在法律上享有收回土地的权利,但实际上难以收回、有效利用。其主要成因包括入股合同的约定欠周延,农地流转和土地股份组织制度衔接不足,政府投资建设的农业设施的处置规则不明,以及农地纠纷解决机制效能不高。在风险应对方面,不应固守单一的组织法视角,而是需要坚持系统性思维,综合施策予以现实应对,重点包括强化合同治理提高入股合同的周延性,深化农地流转和土地股份组织制度的衔接,健全政府投资建设的农业设施的处置规则,以及构筑更加便捷高效的农地纠纷调处机制。The fear of losing land is a significant factor restricting land management right investment.Based on an analysis of institutional texts and practical disputes,the risk of land loss is mainly recessive,that is,although the right to recover land is legally enjoyed,it is difficult to recover and effectively use it in practice.The main causes are the imperfection of the investment contract,the lack of connection between the rural land transfer system and land stock organization system,the unclear rules for the disposal of government-funded agricultural facilities,and the low efficiency of the farmland dispute resolution mechanism.To address these risks,we should adopt a systematic approach and comprehensive policies,rather than adhering to a single organizational perspective.This includes strengthening the contract governance to improve the completeness of investment contracts,deepening the connection between the rural land transfer system and land stock organization system,improving the rules for the disposal of government-funded agricultural facilities,and constructing a more convenient and efficient dispute settlement mechanism.

关 键 词：土地经营权入股 失地风险 隐性失地 流转风险 农民权益 

分 类 号：DF45[政治法律—经济法学]