打破机构监管藩篱:法经济学视野下Fintech风险的系统治理  

Break Down Institutional Regulatory Barriers:Systemic Governance of Fintech Risks in the Perspective of Legal Economics

作　　者：赵一鸣 YIMING ZHAO(School of Law and Economics, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学法与经济学院

出　　处：《工信财经科技》2024年第4期159-172,共14页Review of Financial & Technological Economics

摘　　要：停留于机构监管范式的《中华人民共和国金融稳定法(草案)》难以防范与消解Fintech风险,缺乏对Fintech公司建立有效的行为规制,存在严重的路径依赖问题。本文认为,以演化博弈理论为视角,基于包含监管机构、金融机构和Fintech公司的三方博弈模型,系统治理Fintech风险尚需以下配套措施:坚持系统观念,将Fintech公司纳入《中华人民共和国金融稳定法(草案)》监管对象范围;夯实技术基础,警惕“监管俘获”风险;调整问责形式,优化履职合规免责条款;抓住主要矛盾,聚焦系统重要性金融机构。The Financial Stability Law,which is stuck in the institutional regulatory paradigm,is struggling to prevent and mitigate Fintech risks,and lacks of effective behavioral regulation on Fintech firms,with serious path-dependency issues.From the perspective of evolutionary game theory and based on a model that includes regulators,financial institutions and Fintech companies,the following supporting measures are needed to systematically manage Fintech risks.Insisting on a systemic view to bring Fintech firms within the scope of regulation;strengthening the technological base and alerting to the risk of ‘regulatory capture';adjusting forms of accountability and optimizing exemption clauses;seize the main contradictions and focus on systemically important financial institutions.

关 键 词：机构监管 金融科技 法经济学 演化博弈 

分 类 号：D922.28[政治法律—经济法学]