突发事件下考虑社会学习的零售商哄抬价格行为演化博弈分析  

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Retailers' Price Inflating Behavior Considering Social Learning under Emergencies

作　　者：王珂[1] 马轩 张泉欣 WANG Ke MA Xuan ZHANG Quanxin(Shanghai University,Shanghai,China)

机构地区：[1]上海大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2024年第7期1087-1096,共10页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(22YJA630089)。

摘　　要：针对突发事件下零售商哄抬价格行为,创新性地引入社会学习理论,构建零售商群体演化博弈模型,并通过数值模拟探究社会学习及相关因素对系统演化的影响。研究表明:社会学习强度越大,零售商哄抬价格的社会学习效应越强,其对零售商决策影响越大,促使更多零售商哄抬价格;而使整个零售商群体向哄抬价格方向演化的初始参与比例阈值,随社会学习强度增大而降低。加大对哄抬价格行为的惩罚和曝光力度,避免“法不责众”,提高补贴力度,能明显减弱社会学习效应对系统演化趋势的影响,促使更多零售商不参与哄抬价格。Concerning the price-inflating behavior of retailers under emergencies,the social learning theory is innovatively introduced to construct an evolutionary game model to explore the impact of social learning and related factors on system evolution through numerical simulation.The results show that as the intensity of social learning increases,the social learning effect has a greater impact on retailers' price-inflating decisions,thus prompting more retailers to inflate prices.However,the threshold of initial participation proportion that leads retailers to evolve towards price inflating decreases with the increase of social learning intensity.Increasing the punishment and exposure of price inflation,avoiding the “laws fail where the violators are legion”,and increasing subsidies,significantly reduced the influence of the social learning effect on the evolutionary trend of the system,thereby prompting more retailers not to inflate prices.

关 键 词：突发事件 社会学习 哄抬价格 演化博弈 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]