基于消费者绿色偏好和渠道竞争的制造商分散式入侵策略  

Manufacturer's Decentralized Encroachment Strategy with Consumer Green Preference and Channel Competition

作　　者：李进[1] 刘格格 张海霞 张江华[3] Li Jin;Liu Gege;Zhang Haixia;Zhang Jianghua(Modern Business Research Center,School of Management and E-Business,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310018,China;School of Tourism and Urban-rural Planning,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310018,China;School of Management,Shandong University,Jinan 250100,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学现代商贸研究中心,管理工程与电子商务学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]浙江工商大学旅游与城乡规划学院,浙江杭州310018 [3]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第7期281-290,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：浙江省自然科学基金项目(LZ24G020001);国家社会科学基金项目(23AGL019);浙江省教育厅一般科研项目(Y202147845)。

摘　　要：数字经济和电子商务使得制造商销售绿色产品入侵到零售市场成为可能。现有文献大多研究制造商集中式入侵策略,而考虑给其零售部门更多自主权的制造商分散式入侵的研究却鲜有出现。本文考虑消费者绿色偏好、渠道竞争和入侵成本等,允许制造商通过一个转移价格赋予其零售部门自主定价权,构建制造商生产绿色产品的分散式入侵模型。然后,求解出集中式入侵和分散式入侵模型的均衡解和入侵条件。在此基础上,分析消费者绿色偏好和渠道竞争对制造商集中式入侵和分散式入侵下绿色水平、销售决策和利润的影响。研究表明:分散式入侵策略下,制造商通过向其零售部门征收转移价格,缓解了与其下游零售商之间的渠道竞争强度,从而提高了供应链中各成员的利润及产品的绿色度。除此之外,分散式入侵还可以减少环境破坏并增加社会福利。最后,利用数值仿真对参数进行了灵敏度分析,并验证了研究结果的鲁棒性。The digital economy and e-commerce have made it possible for manufacturers to sell green products and encroach into the retail market.Although the manufacturer's decentralized encroachment strategy is widely used in domestic and foreign business practices,in current related research,there are few studies on the manufacturer’s decentralized encroachment strategy considering giving more autonomy to their retail subsidiary.Based on this,consumer green preference,channel competition and encroachment costs,and constructs a dualchannel green supply chain centralized encroachmentmodel and a decentralized encroachmentmodel that allows the manufacturer to give its retail subsidiary independent pricing power via a transfer price are considered.Under the centralized encroachment,the retailer and the manufacturer involves in a direct competition in the retail market.The manufacturer produces green products and sells them directly to consumers.The manufacturer makes sales decisions in a centralized manner.At the same time,the manufacturer also wholesales green products to the retailer in traditional wholesale channel.Under the decentralized encroachment,the retailer will compete with the retail subsidiary of the manufacturer,and the manufacturer will sell the green products to its retail subsidiary at a unit transfer price.Due to the transfer price,the face-to-face conflict between the manufacturer and the retailer will be avoided.The retail subsidiary can make independent sales decisions and maximize its own profits.In the modelsproposed in this paper,there is a stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer.Firstly,the backward-induction method is used to solve the equilibrium solution and the encroachment conditions of the centralized and decentralized encroachmentmodels.On this basis,the influence of consumer green preference and channel competition on the green level,sales decision and profits is analyzed under centralized and decentralized encroachment.Secondly,the social welfare under the two encroachment

关 键 词：双渠道 制造商入侵 绿色供应链 消费者绿色偏好 渠道竞争 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F274