基于顾客等待厌恶的可插队服务系统的定价策略研究  

Pricing strategy in the queuing services with customer interjections and delaying aversion

作　　者：张怡通 徐秀丽[2] ZHANG Yitong;XU Xiuli(School of Economics and Management,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao 066004,China;School of Science,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao 066004,China)

机构地区：[1]燕山大学经济管理学院,秦皇岛066004 [2]燕山大学理学院,秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2024年第7期2339-2351,共13页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(62171143);河北省自然科学基金面上项目(G2024203008)。

摘　　要：为限制顾客的插队行为,许多服务商考虑为顾客设置插队费用和入场费用,该措施能有效规范顾客的排队秩序,使得服务系统的运营机制高效有序.本文基于可插队排队系统,通过设置等待厌恶心理参数来反映普通顾客排队等待时的心理负效用,探讨策略性消费者平均等待时间的纵向差异化和有限理性行为规律.数值实验表明并不是插队概率越高社会收益越大,合理的服务定价决策可以减少顾客的插队乱象从而实现社会利益最大化.厘清消费者的插队行为、服务商的定价策略和顾客插队行为下收益增量之间的交互作用机制,不仅为可插队排队系统的定价费用研究提供管理学启示,更重要的是帮助企业和社会消除消费者排队等待时产生的心理不公平感知,提高整体服务效率,确保社会经济可持续发展.To control customer interjections,many service providers are considering setting reasonable interjection costs and admission fees for customers.The pricing strategy can effectively regulate the queue order and ensure the efficient operation of service enterprises.Based on the queue-interjection system,this paper explored the longitudinal differentiation of the expected waiting time and the limited rational behavior of strategic consumers by setting the waiting aversion psychological parameters to reflect the negative utility of ordinary customers.The numerical results illustrated that excessive interjection probability may harm social gains,and reasonable service pricing decisions can reduce customer interjections and maximize social benefits.Clarifying the interaction between consumer interjections,pricing strategies of service providers,and incremental revenues can provide management insights for queuing systems.More importantly,the research results may help society and enterprises eliminate the perceived psychological unfairness of ordinary customers,improve overall service efficiency,and ensure sustainable socio-economic development.

关 键 词：插队行为 等待时间 均衡行为 等待厌恶 定价策略 

分 类 号：O226[理学—运筹学与控制论]