区块链视角下知识产权质押融资演化博弈分析  

Analysis of the Evolutionary Game of Intellectual Property Pledge Financing from the Perspective of Blockchain

作　　者：陈莹 袁金龙 任克京 高成凤 CHEN Ying;YUAN Jinlong;REN Kejing;GAO Chengfeng(Liaoning Inspection,Examination&Certification Centre,Shenyang 110036,China)

机构地区：[1]辽宁省检验检测认证中心,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《品牌与标准化》2024年第5期167-170,共4页

摘　　要：分别在有无区块链条件下构建演化博弈模型,探究区块链的引入对银行和科技型中小企业间合作机制的建立及博弈均衡的影响。研究表明,引入区块链后,基于信息获取成本的降低和获取效率的提升,银行的审核意愿逐渐增强;企业虚报知识产权价值的成本急剧增加且后果严重,能够有效遏制其舞弊意愿;质押融资最终趋向帕累托最优稳定均衡状态。Build an evolutionary game model with and without blockchain technology to investigate the impact of introducing blockchain on the establishment of cooperation mechanisms and game equilibrium between banks and technology-oriented small and medium enterprises(SMEs).Research shows that after the introduction of blockchain,the willingness of banks to audit gradually increases due to the reduction of information acquisition costs and improvement of efficiency;the cost of over-reporting intellectual property value by companies sharply rises and leads to severe consequences,effectively curbing their fraudulent intentions;collateral financing ultimately tends towards a Pareto optimal stable equilibrium state.

关 键 词：区块链 科技型中小企业 知识产权 质押融资 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F204