Central environmental protection inspection and carbon emission reduction: A tripartite evolutionary game model from the perspective of carbon neutrality  

作　　者：Zhen-Hua Zhang Dan Ling Qin-Xin Yang Yan-Chao Feng Jing Xiu 

机构地区：[1]School of Economics,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000,Gansu,China [2]Institute of Green Finance,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000,Gansu,China [3]School of Management,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000,Gansu,China [4]School of Business,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,Henan,China [5]Institute of Economics,Jilin Academy of Social Sciences,Changchun,130033,Jilin,China

出　　处：《Petroleum Science》2024年第3期2139-2153,共15页石油科学（英文版）

基　　金：the financial support from the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of China(2022M720131);Spring Sunshine Collaborative Research Project of the Ministry of Education(202201660);Youth Project of Gansu Natural Science Foundation(22JR5RA542);General Project of Gansu Philosophy and Social Science Foundation(2022YB014);National Natural Science Foundation of China(72034003,72243006,and 71874074);Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(2023lzdxjbkyzx008,lzujbky-2021-sp72)。

摘　　要：Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection(CEPI)on driving carbon emission reduction,and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other.The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases.When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%,50%—80%,the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%,60%—30%.The evolutionary result of“thorough inspection,regulation implementation,low-carbon management”is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game.Moreover,the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit,the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears.This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.

关 键 词：Central environmental protection INSPECTION Local government Manufacturing enterprise Tripartite evolutionary game Carbon emission reduction 

分 类 号：X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程]