电商背景下考虑参考价格效应的低碳产品制造商入侵研究  

A Study on the Invasion of Low-carbon Product Manufacturers Considering Reference Price Effect in the Context of E-commerce

作　　者：黄建平 HUANG Jian-ping(School of Management,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430081,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430081

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2024年第6期42-46,共5页Logistics Engineering and Management

摘　　要：构建由低碳产品制造商作为领导者、零售商作为追随者组成的Stackelberg博弈模型,制造商可能通过电商渠道入侵市场,而消费者会对比不同渠道价格,即受到参考价格效应的影响。研究发现:(1)当制造商入侵市场时,参考价格系数和低碳敏感度的增加都会使得制造商提高碳减排努力程度,同时电商渠道和线下渠道的销售数量将提高。(2)只有当低碳敏感性系数较高时,制造商和零售商才能够就制造商的入侵行为达成共赢,且这种共赢的可能性随消费者对线下渠道忠诚度的提高而增加(尽管消费者对线下渠道忠诚度的增加会降低制造商入侵的意愿)。(3)入侵行为总会增加制造商的生产量,即能促进低碳产品的消费。A Stackelberg game model consisting of low-carbon product manufacturers as leaders and retailers as followers is constructed,manufacturers may invade the market through e-commerce channels,while consumers will compare the prices of different channels,who are affected by the reference price effect.It is found that(1)when manufacturers invade the market,both the reference price coefficient and the increase of low carbon sensitivity will make manufacturers increase the level of carbon reduction efforts,while the number of sales in e-commerce channels and offline channels will increase.(2)Manufacturers and retailers will be able to reach a win-win situation with respect to manufacturer invasion only when the low-carbon sensitivity coefficient is high,and the likelihood of such a win-win situation increases with consumer loyalty to the offline channel(even though increased consumer loyalty to the offline channel reduces the manufacturer's willingness to invade).(3)Invasion always leads to an increase in production by the manufacturer,which can promote the consumption of low-carbon products.

关 键 词：制造商入侵 参考价格效应 低碳努力 供应链管理 

分 类 号：F724.6[经济管理—产业经济]