电子商务中消费者虚假信息披露行为影响研究  

The Impact of Consumer Misrepresentation in E-commerce

作　　者：成燕 梅姝娥[2] 仲伟俊[2] CHENG Yan;MEI Shu-e;ZHONG Weijun(Department of Economics and Management,Party School of C.P.C Jiangsu Committee〔Jiangsu Institute of Administration〕,Nanjing 210013,China;School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 210096,China)

机构地区：[1]中共江苏省委党校〔江苏行政学院〕经济管理教研部,江苏南京210013 [2]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096

出　　处：《南京工程学院学报（社会科学版）》2024年第2期66-77,共12页Journal of Nanjing Institute of Technology：Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目“电子商务中基于隐私信息经济性的隐私信息保护和应用策略研究”(17BGL196);中共江苏省委党校“学习贯彻党的二十大精神”创新工程科研专项课题。

摘　　要：电子商务环境下,消费者通过披露隐私信息可换取企业的个性化服务。由于担心隐私泄露风险,提供虚假信息的现象也广泛存在。理清消费者虚假信息的披露策略和影响机理有助于实现企业和消费者在消费者隐私信息价值创造上的共赢。构建相关博弈模型能够研究市场完全覆盖和市场不完全覆盖两种情形下消费者虚假信息披露策略选择及其对企业个性化服务水平和利润的影响。研究结果表明:若市场完全覆盖,消费者可以无差别选择是否提供虚假信息,而虚假信息的存在会抑制企业个性化服务投入;当企业个性化服务回报率较低时,虚假信息的存在能够提升企业利润。若市场不完全覆盖,当企业个性化服务回报率或虚假信息披露的边际成本较低时,消费者会披露虚假信息,进入市场的消费者数量会相应上升;当企业个性化服务回报率较高时,企业会降低服务投入;当企业个性化服务回报率较低且消费者提供虚假信息的边际成本较高时,虚假信息的存在反而能够提升企业利润。研究结果在拓展消费者隐私信息保护和应用理论的同时,也为电子商务企业在消费者自我隐私保护情形下如何激励隐私信息披露提供了一定的借鉴意义。In the context of e-commerce,consumers can exchange privacy information for personalized services of enterprises,but the phenomenon of providing false information is also widespread due to concerns about privacy breaches.This paper constructs a relevant game model to study the choices of consumers' false information disclosure strategy and its impact on enterprises' personalized service level and profits of businesses under two situations:complete market coverage and incomplete market coverage.The research results indicate that in the case of complete market coverage,consumers can indifferently choose whether to provide false information,and the presence of false information will inhibit the investment in personalized services by businesses.When the return on investment for personalized services is relatively low,the existence of false information can enhance business profits.In the case of incomplete market coverage,when the return rate of personalized services or the marginal cost of disclosing false information is low,consumers will disclose false information,and the number of consumers entering the market will increase accordingly.When the return rate of personalized services is high,businesses will reduce their investment in services.When the return rate of personalized services is low and the marginal cost of consumers providing false information is high,the presence of false information can instead increase business profits.The results not only expand the theory of consumer privacy information protection and application,but also provide a certain reference for e-commerce enterprises on how to encourage the disclosure of privacy information in the case of consumer self-privacy protection.

关 键 词：虚假信息披露 隐私信息 个性化服务回报率 服务感知 隐私风险感知 

分 类 号：F713.36[经济管理—产业经济]