考虑双源采购中断的高端制造供应链契约协调  

Contract Coordination of High-end Manufacturing Supply Chain Considering Dualsource Procurement Interruption

作　　者：曾敏刚[1] 臧明华 ZENG Mingang;ZANG Minghua(School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640

出　　处：《物流技术》2024年第7期95-109,共15页Logistics Technology

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(17JZD020);广东省哲学社会科学规划资助项目(GD21CGL33);广东省基础与应用基础研究专项资金项目(2017A030313409)。

摘　　要：当下复杂的政治经济因素使得国内高端制造供应链存在中断风险。双源采购中断背景下,制造商和国内供应商如何通过有效的协调契约提升创新投入水平是发展高端制造供应链急需解决的问题。考虑了由国内外供应商、制造商组成的具有中断风险的双源采购模型,采用Stackelberg博弈方法研究了无协调契约、成本共担契约、价格补贴+成本共担契约对提升创新投入水平和期望利润的作用,并应用Mathematica分析了模型参数对最优结果的影响。结果表明:随着制造商对国内供应商的共担/补贴比例上升,国内供应商的创新投入和期望利润均有所增加;单独的成本共担契约不能有效地协调制造商和国内供应商;在一定的条件下,价格补贴+成本共担契约有效地协调了制造商和国内供应商,实现了帕累托改进。High-end manufacturing is an important object of the Made in China 2025 campaign and the 13th Five-Year Development Plan,and is one of the key points of the future development blueprint of Chi⁃na.The Chinese high-end equipment manufacturing industry is under the dual squeeze of"reshoring"by developed countries in the high-end sector and"substitution and diversion"by developing countries in the medium and low sectors.Only by vigorously advocating the high-end equipment manufacturing industry can we gradually master core key technologies and command industrial discourse power,and lead the overall development trend of the high-end equipment manufacturing industry.The current complex political and economic factors have given rise to the disruption of the domestic high-end manufacturing supply chain.In the context of dual-source procurement disruption,how to effectively reduce the impact of disruption on the high-end manufacturing supply chain through coordination contract,and how to better coordinate man⁃ufacturers and domestic suppliers to improve the level of innovation have become urgent issues to be solved in the development of the high-end manufacturing supply chain.By reviewing previous studies and in light of the current situation,we examined a dual-source procure⁃ment model with interruption risk for a supply chain consisting of domestic and foreign suppliers and manu⁃facturers.According to the model,all the agents aim to maximize their own expected profits,where the man⁃ufacturer,as the leader of the supply chain,preemptively decides the price,and the domestic and foreign sup⁃pliers,as followers,decide on their individual innovation input subsequently.Next,using the Stackelberg game method,we studied the role of no coordination contract,cost sharing contract,price subsidy+cost sharing contract in improving the level of innovation input and expected profit of the supply chain,and used Mathematica to analyze the impact of model parameters on the optimization results.The results showed that as the p

关 键 词：双源采购 高端制造 供应链中断 创新投入 协调契约 

分 类 号：F425[经济管理—产业经济] F274F224