Live-streaming selling strategies for competitive firms  

竞争企业的直播销售策略

作　　者：Quan Du Zhixin Chen Jie Wu Xiang Ji 杜泉;陈智新;吴杰;姬翔(中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026)

机构地区：[1]School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China

出　　处：《中国科学技术大学学报》2024年第5期22-35,I0006,I0007,共16页JUSTC

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72171219,72201264,71921001,71801206,71971203);the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(WK2040000027);the New Liberal Arts Fund of USTC(FSSF-A-230104);the Four Batch Talent Programs of China.

摘　　要：The booming live-streaming commerce has significantly changed the traditional e-commerce model,thus attracting much attention from both industry and academia.In recent years,an increasing number of scholars have applied analytical models to explore live-streaming strategies for firms in different scenarios.However,the previous literature mainly considers monopolists,while in the real world,competition is not rare.To fill this gap between the literature and practical observations,this paper applies a game theoretical model to study live-streaming adoption and pricing strategy for firms under competitive environments.The results show that,for competitive firms,the equilibrium strategy depends on the relation between the commission rate and the intensity of the market expansion effect.Additionally,compared to the case in which no firm adopts live-streaming,competitive firms do not always benefit from the adoption of live-streaming selling.The paper also shows that competition plays a negative role in inducing a firm to adopt live-streaming.蓬勃发展的直播商务极大地改变了传统的电子商务模式,引起了业界和学术界的广泛关注。近年来,越来越多的学者运用分析模型来探讨企业在不同场景下的直播策略。然而,以往的文献主要考虑垄断者,而在现实世界中,竞争并不罕见。为了弥补这一文献与实际观察之间的差距,本文应用博弈论模型对竞争环境下企业的直播采用和定价策略进行了研究。结果表明,对于竞争企业,均衡策略取决于佣金率与市场扩张效应强度之间的关系。此外,相对于没有企业采用直播的情况,有竞争力的企业并不总是能从采用直播销售中受益。本文还表明,竞争在诱导企业采用直播方面发挥了负面作用。

关 键 词：live-streaming commerce live-streaming strategy game COMPETITION 

分 类 号：F713.36[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32