基于三方演化博弈的众包物流平台协同发展研究  

On the Collaborative Development of Crowd-sourcing Logistics Platform Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

作　　者：师亚玲 SHI Yaling(School of Economics and Management,Huaibei Normal University,Huaibei 235000,Anhui,China)

机构地区：[1]淮北师范大学经济与管理学院,安徽淮北235000

出　　处：《合肥大学学报》2024年第4期40-47,82,共9页Journal of Hefei University

基　　金：安徽省高等学校哲学社会科学研究重大项目“淮海经济区煤炭资源枯竭型城市群低碳转型协同发展机制及对策研究”(2022AH040060);安徽高校科学研究一般项目“基于服务与价格竞争的服务外包协调决策模型研究”(KJ2021B06);安徽省大学生创新创业训练计划项目“双碳背景下基于演化博弈的农产品冷链物流策略研究”(S202310373026)。

摘　　要：为了探究众包物流平台中各博弈方的策略选择并促进各方协同发展,构建了外部支持机构、平台企业和配送员参与的众包物流协同发展三方演化博弈模型,探讨了博弈三方在协同发展过程中的策略选择,并通过数值仿真分析了众包物流平台协同发展策略选择的影响因素。研究结果表明:外部支持机构、平台企业和配送员三方对于彼此之间的参与意愿的影响程度大小各不相同。平台企业受到外部支持机构参与意愿的影响则较大,配送员对于外部支持机构中政府监管部门政策的变化反映更灵敏,配送员对于收益分配和惩罚力度方面的变化敏感程度大于平台企业。In order to explore the strategy choice of each game party in the crowd-sourcing logistics platform and promote the collaborative development of all parties,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving external support organizations,platform enterprises and distribution personnel,and discusses the strategy choice of the three in the process of collaborative development,and analyzes the influencing factors of the strategy choice of the crowd-sourcing logistics platform through numerical simulation.The results show that external support organizations,platform enterprises and deliverers have different degrees of influence on each other’s participation intention.On the other hand,platform enterprises are more affected by the participation willingness of external support institutions.Distribution personnel are more sensitive to changes in government regulatory policies in external support institutions,and distribution personnel are more sensitive to changes in income distribution and punishment intensity than platform enterprises.

关 键 词：三方演化博弈 众包物流平台 协同发展 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]