应对不信任问题的“公司+农户”供应链策略性决策研究  

Strategic Decisions in Company+Farmer Supply Chains Coping with Distrust

作　　者：魏光兴 潘媛媛 WEI Guangxing;PAN Yuanyuan(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《工业工程》2024年第4期102-111,131,共11页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(20FGLB031)。

摘　　要：“公司+农户”是提高农产品供应链运作效率的一种重要模式,但是其中存在不信任问题,农户不会完全相信公司传递的市场信息。构建供应链博弈模型,研究应对农户不信任的公司信息传递和农户产能安排决策,分析农户不信任对供应链决策和农户利润等的影响。研究发现:(1)农户不信任促使公司策略性地传递市场信息,如果公司比农户看好市场行情会传递缩小的信息,反之,会传递夸大的信息;(2)农户会策略性地调节产能计划,如果公司比农户看好市场行情会扩大产能计划,反之,会缩小;(3)公司的策略性信息传递和农户的策略性产能调节能够应对农户不信任对公司利润和农户产能安排的不利影响,但是农户不信任必然会引起农户利润偏差,使农户实际所得利润总是低于预期利润。The company+farmer supply chain is an important mode for improving operational efficiency of agricultural supply chains.However,there is a problem of distrust that farmers may not fully trust the market information provided by companies.A supply chain game model is developed to investigate the strategies for addressing farmer distrust in company information transmitting and farmer capacity planning decisions,and to analyze the impact of farmer distrust on operational decisions and farmer profits.Resutls are concluded as follows.Firstly,companies transmit market information strategically;farmer distrust prompts companies to not transmit accurate market information.Companies tend to transmit shrank information if they are more optimistic about market conditions than farmers,otherwise they transmit exaggerated information.Secondly,farmers adjust their productive capacity plans strategically.They increase the capacity if companies are more optimistic about market conditions than farmers,whereas they reduce the capacity.Thirdly,strategic information transmission by companies and strategic capacity adjustments by farmers can cope with the unfavorable effect of farmer distrust on both company profits and farmer capacity planning.However,farmer distrust inevitably leads to profit discrepancies,resulting in farmers consistently earning lower profits than expected.

关 键 词：“公司+农户”供应链 农户不信任 策略性决策 

分 类 号：F406.11[经济管理—产业经济] F274F323