论董事忠实义务的程序性保障——以利益冲突披露义务为中心  

Examining the Obligation to Disclose Conflicting Interests: Procedural Safeguards for Directors' Duty of Loyalty

作　　者：袁崇霖 Yuan Chonglin

机构地区：[1]清华大学法学院

出　　处：《交大法学》2024年第5期80-93,共14页SJTU Law Review

基　　金：上海市哲学社会科学规划课题青年项目“公司合规机制的董事义务之维”(项目编号:2022EFX007)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：作为忠实义务的程序性保障,董事的利益冲突披露经历了从规则要素、义务雏形到规则体系的法律演进阶段。我国公司法虽然对此给予了部分立法确认,却未能促成其向常态义务的完整嬗变。利益冲突披露义务应当建立在董事受信义务人地位的基础上,为忠实义务实现提供信息基础和纠纷预防的功能,并能够弥合实质审查的不确定性,缓和外部评价的信息不对称。在面临重大利益冲突时,董事应以书面方式,向董事会或其他全部董事履行披露义务。现行法未区分违反利益冲突披露义务的责任和与交易有关的责任,无法充分救济公司损失。董事若违反利益冲突披露义务,应就其行为本身承担损失赔偿责任、失去抗辩及章定责任等法律后果。如存在后续利益冲突交易,该交易还需接受完全公平标准检验,董事则对应承担利益归入责任。As one of the procedural safeguards for the duty of loyalty,directors’duty to disclose conflicting interests has basically been recognized as an independent duty in the common law,while it has not accomplished its transformation from a defensive factor into a completed duty in China.The disclosure duty,which is based on the theory of fiduciary duty,functions as a hinge to provide information of directors’fidelity,to prevent potential disputes and to reduce information asymmetry for judicial intervention.To perform the disclosure duty,a director should declare in writing to the board the material interests when facing a conflict of interest.Breach of the duty is subject to the loss of defense and liabilities of compensation for damages and other alternatives according to the company’s articles.If there is a corresponding conflict of interest transaction,the transaction should be reviewed under the entire fairness test and the director should disgorge all the profits.

关 键 词：董事忠实义务 披露义务 利益冲突 信息机制 

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