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作 者:郑月龙[1,2] 白春光 叶林 张龄月 ZHENG Yueong;BAI Chunguang;YE Lin;ZHANG Lingyue(School of Business Administration,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China;School of Management and Economic,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China)
机构地区:[1]重庆工商大学工商管理学院,重庆400067 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都611731
出 处:《管理工程学报》2024年第5期81-103,共23页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基 金:国家社会科学基金项目(20BJY005)。
摘 要:本文研究了一个由高校院所进行基础研究和制造企业负责后续商业开发的共性技术跨组织合作研发激励模型及其选择问题。本文将政府支持与合同激励放在同一框架,运用博弈论方法为制造企业设计产出导向单一激励模型、产出导向+过程监控激励模型及“政府支持+”综合激励模型以激发高校院所基础研究的积极性,同时解析了激励模型选择、影响因素及机理。研究表明:“政府支持+”综合激励模型是三种激励模型中的占优模型、产出导向+过程监控激励模型优于产出导向单一激励模型;双方收益分享系数具有促进和抑制高校院所认真履责行为的双重作用,且对其机会主义行为具有抑制作用,对制造企业后续商业开发行为及预期收益有“倒U型”影响;高校院所基础研究的影响系数在双方收益分享系数对制造企业后续商业开发努力的影响中发挥调节作用;政府补贴对高校院所和制造企业的合作研发行为具有明显的正向激励作用;惩罚系数可有效抑制高校院所的机会主义行为。Industrial Generic Technologies(IGTs)have the potential to be used in diverse sectors and enable great dynamism in innovation,which can create a wave of change across the economy.To realize the potential and technical dynamism of IGTs,this study examines the incentive model selection of cross-organizational cooperation research and development(R&D)for IGTs,which is conducted by universities,institutes,and manufacturing enterprises.It explores the process by which the manufacturing enterprises stimulate colleges and universities to adopt a responsible strategy as well as how they restrain the level of effort expended in the opportunistic strategies.As a public science and technology product,government support plays a vital role in IGTs R&D.Consequently,the R&D and non-R&D subsidies that government provides can smoothly promote the IGTs R&D activities of universities,institutes,and manufacturing enterprises.However,it is also important to explore the mechanism by which it works.Accordingly,this study contextualizes government support and incentive contracts in the same framework.To stimulate the enthusiasm of universities and institutes in conducting basic research,manufacturing enterprises design an output-oriented single incentive model,output-oriented and process monitoring incentive model,and“government support”and comprehensive incentive model.This study uses the game theory to compare and analyze the three generic technology cross-organization cooperation R&D incentive models and draws the following conclusions.First,fixed remuneration has no incentive for colleges and universities to conscientiously perform their duties.The cooperative R&D behavior with manufacturing enterprises has a positive incentive effect.The penalty coefficient can effectively restrain the opportunistic behavior effort level of colleges and universities;the influence coefficient of basic research effort on market returns has a positive incentive effect on the R&D effort level of generic technical cooperation.Second,the revenue shar
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