非控股股东积极参与决策提升了资产定价效率吗?--基于股价信息含量的考察视角  

Do non-controlling shareholders′active participation in decision making enhance asset pricing efficiency?Based on the perspective of stock price informativeness

作　　者：鲁乔杉 李秉祥[1] 张涛[1,3] LU Qiaoshan;LI Bingxiang;ZHANG Tao(School of Economics and Management,Xi’an University of Technology,Xi′an 710048,China;Business School,Xi’an University of Finance and Economics,Xi’an 710100,China;Gansu University of Political Science and Law,Business School,Lanzhou 730070,China)

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710048 [2]西安财经大学商学院,陕西西安710100 [3]甘肃政法大学商学院,甘肃兰州730070

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2024年第5期306-323,共18页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：陕西省哲学社会科学研究专项青年项目(2023QN0108);西安财经大学“雁塔学者”支持项目。

摘　　要：股价信息含量对资本市场运行效率具有重要的评价作用。股价的信息含量较低,意味着股价中的公司特质性信息的融入程度较低,严重损害了股票价格引导资源配置的效率。本文以2006年至2019年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,从股价信息含量视角出发,通过上市公司股东大会的投票数据,探究非控股股东积极参与决策对股价信息含量的影响效应及内在作用机制。结果发现,非控股股东积极参与企业决策可以显著提高上市公司股价信息含量。该结论在经过一系列稳健性检验,并考虑内生性问题之后依然成立。进一步研究表明,在股权集中度高、企业信息透明度低、非“四大”审计的企业中,非控股股东参与企业决策积极性高则更有利于提高股价信息含量。研究证明非控股股东参与决策能够通过发挥“监督效应”的作用机制,进而影响股价信息含量。影响渠道的分析结果表明,抑制控股股东“掏空”行为和企业私有信息隐藏行为,是非控股股东积极参与决策提升股价信息含量的作用渠道。Stock price informativeness,which reflects the degree of incorporation of company-specific information into the stock price,is an important indicator for evaluating the efficiency of capital market operation.Low information content of stock price means that the integration of company-specific information into stock price is low,which is the main cause of inefficient operation of capital market.In this paper,we focus on the effect of non-controlling shareholders′active participation in decision-making on the information content of stock prices and the underlying mechanism of action.Theoretically,there are two possible effects of non-controlling shareholders′active participation in decision making on the information content of share prices:first is“monitoring effect”.The active participation of non-controlling shareholders in corporate decision-making can effectively monitor and curb the self-interest-seeking behavior of internal interests for opportunistic motives,which improves the information environment of the company and helps to improve the information content of the stock price.Secondly,“catering effect”.The active participation of non-controlling shareholders in corporate decision-making will bring more pressure to managers.At this time,managers are more likely to manipulate earnings to meet the wishes of non-controlling shareholders,which reduces the transparency of corporate information and thus leads to a decrease in the information content of share prices.The relationship between the motivation of non-controlling shareholders to participate in decision making and the information content of share price cannot be determined theoretically and needs to be tested empirically.Therefore,based on the existing relevant research,this paper explores the effect of non-controlling shareholders′active participation in decision-making on share price information content and the intrinsic mechanism of action from the perspective of share price information content by using voting data of shareholders′meet

关 键 词：非控股股东积极性 股价信息含量 信息不对称 资源配置 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F271F275