The Impact of Short Selling Disclosure Regulatory Constraint on the Lending Market and Stock Ownership  

作　　者：Geoffrey Ducournau Jinliang Li Yan Li Zigan Wang Qie Ellie Yin 

机构地区：[1]Tsinghua University,Beijing,China [2]The University of Hong Kong,Hong Kong,China [3]Tsinghua University,Shenzhen,China [4]Hong Kong Baptist University,Hong Kong,China

出　　处：《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》2024年第3期99-114,共16页现代会计与审计（英文版）

摘　　要：We examine the impact of the short sell disclosure(SSD)regime on the stock lending market and investor behaviors,employing a staggered difference-indifference(DiD)methodology.Our research reveals that the introduction of the disclosure regime enhances market transparency,resulting in a diminished appeal of stock ownership in the lending market for active investors.This shift is accompanied by a reduction in information leakage risks and longer loan durations.Specifically,our analysis reveals a significant decrease in the risk of loan recall by 4.87%,accompanied by an average increase of 23.72%in loan duration for short selling activities.Furthermore,the cost associated with short-sell disclosure causes a decline in both lending supply and short demand.

关 键 词：short sell disclosure stock equity lending market stock ownership 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]