审计费用与高管政治关联对盈余管理的影响  

The Impact of Audit Fees and Senior Management's Political Connections on Earnings Management

作　　者：李飞凤[1] LI Feifeng(School of Economics and Management,Huainan Union University,Huainan Anhui 232038,China)

机构地区：[1]淮南联合大学经济管理学院,安徽淮南232038

出　　处：《乐山师范学院学报》2024年第8期91-102,140,共13页Journal of Leshan Normal University

摘　　要：选取2010-2021年期间我国A股市场上的上市公司为对象,形成分析模型,并探讨审计费用、高管政治关联与应计和真实盈余管理之间的相关关系。研究发现:审计费用支出越多,应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理越弱;相对而言,高管存在政治关联的上市公司,其对应的应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理较强;高管政治关联会降低审计费用对真实盈余管理行为的抑制作用,而并没有减弱审计费用对应计盈余管理行为的抑制作用。This paper,selecting China's A-share listed companies for the period of 2010 to 2021 as the research object,discusses the relationship among audit costs,senior management's political connections,accrual surplus management and real surplus management.The study has found that the more audit fees are spent,the weaker accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management are;relatively speaking,the listed companies with political connections of senior executives have stronger corresponding accrual-based and real earnings management;the political connections of senior executives tend to reduce the inhibitory effect of audit fees on the real earnings management behaviour without weakening the inhibitory effect of audit fees on accrual-based earnings management behavior.

关 键 词：应计盈余管理 真实盈余管理 审计费用 高管政治关联 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学] F275[经济管理—国民经济] D630[政治法律—政治学]