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作 者:喻洁[1] 曹阳 鄢鹏阳 李扬[1] YU Jie;CAO Yang;YAN Pengyang;LI Yang(School of Electrical Engineering,Southeast University,Nanjing 210096,Jiangsu Province,China;State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Company Hangzhou Power Supply Company,Hangzhou 310016,Zhejiang Province,China;The College of Software Engineering,Southeast University,Nanjing 210096,Jiangsu Province,China)
机构地区:[1]东南大学电气工程学院,江苏省南京市210096 [2]国网浙江省电力有限公司杭州供电公司,浙江省杭州市310016 [3]东南大学软件学院,江苏省南京市210096
出 处:《电网技术》2024年第9期3745-3757,I0066-I0071,共19页Power System Technology
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目智能电网联合基金项目(U1966204);国家自然科学基金面上项目(51977032)。
摘 要:随着工商业用户能源种类多样化及其耦合程度紧密化,通过激励消费者剩余价值引导综合能源用户参与需求响应,对于降低综合能源系统运行成本以及提高用户能效具有积极意义。该文设计了基于消费者剩余的体验估值函数,并将其考虑在用户侧目标函数中,通过演化博弈推导工商业用户参与需求响应的动态过程,从而克服传统分析方法对用户侧参与需求响应的定值设置。该文建立了基于用户侧需求响应演化博弈的综合能源系统优化运营模型,上层建立了区域综合能源系统优化模型,计算面向用户的用能价格;下层建立了考虑剩余价值的区域综合能源系统用户响应模型,并进行演化博弈推导。算例基于电-热-气综合能源系统,采用演化博弈分析了需求侧市场用户响应行为及其影响因素。结果表明,工商业两类用户参与需求响应使得综合能源系统的运行总成本降低5.5%,同时两类用户效用分别提高了51.91%和44.29%。所提模型和方法不仅可以模拟用户侧需求响应动态博弈过程,而且能够为综合能源系统中运营商和需求侧用户的策略选择提供有益参考。With the increasing diversification of energy types and the close coupling of industrial and commercial users,incentivizing consumers to participate in demand response by tapping into surplus value significantly reduces the operational costs of comprehensive energy systems and improves user energy efficiency.This paper designs and incorporates an experiential valuation function based on consumer surplus into the user-side objective function.The dynamic process of industrial and commercial user participation in demand response is derived through evolutionary game theory,overcoming the fixed value settings for user participation in demand response in traditional analysis methods.The paper establishes a comprehensive energy system optimization operation model based on the evolutionary game of user-side demand response.A regional comprehensive energy system optimization model is developed at the upper level.to calculate user-oriented energy prices.A regional comprehensive energy system user response model considering surplus value is established at the lower level,and evolutionary game theory is applied for derivation.Using a case study based on an electricity-heat-gas comprehensive energy system,the paper analyzes demand-side market user response behavior and its influencing factors through evolutionary game analysis.The results indicate that the participation of two types of industrial and commercial users in demand response reduces the overall operating costs of the comprehensive energy system by 5.5%.In comparison,the utility of the two types of users increases by 51.91%and 44.29%,respectively.The model and methods proposed in this paper can simulate the dynamic game process of user-side demand response and provide useful reference for strategy selection for operators and demand-side users in comprehensive energy systems.
关 键 词:演化博弈 需求侧响应 区域综合能源市场 有限理性
分 类 号:TM721[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]
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