绿色偏好视角下的绿色发展: 政府监管、企业转型与金融机构投资选择  

Green development from the perspective of green preference:Government regulation,corporate transformation and investment choice of financial institution

作　　者：潘大鹏 郝亚杰 王雪妍 张紫琼[4] PAN Dapeng;HAO Yajie;WANG Xueyan;ZHANG Ziqiong(Research Center of Cyber Science and Technology,Hangzhou Innovation Institute of Beihang University,Hangzhou 310000,China;School of Business Administration,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310000,China;Research Centre for Digital Innovation and Global Value Chain Upgrading,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310000,China;School of Management,Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin 150001,China)

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学杭州创新研究院网络空间安全研究中心,杭州310000 [2]浙江工商大学工商管理学院,杭州310000 [3]浙江工商大学数字创新与全球价值链升级研究中心,杭州310000 [4]哈尔滨工业大学经济与管理学院,哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2024年第8期2411-2422,共12页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72131005,72274085)。

摘　　要：绿色发展涉及面广,涵盖范围大,利益诉求差异性使得政府、企业和金融机构三方在以自身利益最大化为目标的博弈中无法达成有效共识.本研究基于绿色偏好视角构建三方演化博弈模型,分析了绿色监管、绿色转型和绿色债券投资行为决策之间的相关性.研究发现,政府、企业和金融机构的绿色偏好大小对绿色发展存在不同影响.企业绿色偏好对绿色转型起决定性作用.首先,当企业的绿色偏好较大时,即便政府不进行绿色监管或金融机构不投资绿色债券,企业仍然会进行绿色转型生产.而企业绿色偏好较小时,会出现政府做出绿色监管决策但不产生政策效应的现象.其次,当企业的绿色偏好大小处于特定区间,而金融机构和政府的绿色偏好较大时,存在绿色转型和绿色债券发行同时成功或同时失败两种可能.最后使用数值模拟方法验证了本文主要结论.Green development involves a wide range and covers a large range,so the difference in interest demands makes the government,enterprises and financial institutions unable to reach an effective consensus in the game.This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model based on green preference perspective,and analyzes the relationships among green regulation,green transition,and green bond investment.The study found that the green preference of government,enterprises and financial institutions has different effects on green development.Enterprise green preference plays a decisive role in green transformation.Firstly,when the green preference of the enterprise is large,even if the government does not carry out green regulation or financial institutions do not invest in green bonds,the enterprise will still carry out green transformation production.However,when the green preference of other participants is not large enough,the phenomenon that the government makes green regulatory decisions but has no policy effect will occur.Secondly,when the size of the green preference of enterprises is in a specific range,while the green preference of financial institutions and the government is large,there are two possibilities:The simultaneous success or failure of green transition and green bond issuance.Finally,the main conclusions of this paper are verified by numerical simulation.

关 键 词：绿色发展 绿色债券 绿色偏好 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] C931.6[经济管理—管理学]