数字开源社区异质许可协议下贡献者策略演化及扩散研究  

Research on the evolution and diffusion of contributor strategy under heterogeneous license of digital open source community

作　　者：邢青松 周宝嵘 邓富民 XING Qingsong;ZHOU Baorong;DENG Fumin(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China;Business School,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610065,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074 [2]四川大学商学院,成都610065

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2024年第8期2605-2624,共20页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71401019);重庆市自然科学基金面上项目(CSTB2023NSCQ-MSX0944);重庆市教委人文社科项目(23SKJD082)。

摘　　要：开源创新过程中各参与主体违规使用源代码产生的违约侵权行为不利于开源社区建设发展.对此本研究基于贡献者视角,构建双方演化博弈模型,考虑成本收益因素在不同阶段对初始贡献者和后续贡献者双方演化行为的影响,探讨不同类型许可协议行为限制强度和违约侵权行为间的相互制约关系,借助Lotka-Volterra模型测度不同类型许可协议发展扩散趋势,以期规避违约侵权现象的同时调动广大贡献者协作开发积极性.研究结果表明:在初始阶段非经济收益系数和保护强度的提高对遏制违约侵权现象具有显著作用,限制型许可协议占据大部分市场份额;演化第二阶段后续贡献者积极性不高,经济收益系数是影响初始贡献者策略选择的关键因素,限制型许可协议市场份额仍占据略微优势,对宽松型许可协议的抑制作用逐渐减弱;演化第三阶段随着保护强度和后续贡献者初始意愿的增加,初始贡献者选择宽松型许可协议策略的速度明显提高,此时宽松型许可协议市场竞争力更强,扩散速率更快.In the process of open source innovation,the breach of contract infringement caused by the illegal use of source code by each participant is not conducive to the construction and development of open source community.Based on the perspective of contributors,a two-party evolutionary game model considering the impact of cost-benefit factors on the evolutionary behavior of both initial contributors and subsequent contributors at different stages is constructed to discuss the relationship between the intensity of behavior restriction and the infringement of breach of contract.In order to avoid the phenomenon of breach of contract infringement and mobilize the enthusiasm of the majority of contributors for collaborative development,the Lotka-Volterra model is constructed for measuring the development and diffusion trend of different types of license agreements.The results show that the increase of non-economic benefit coefficient and protection intensity in the initial stage has a significant effect on curbing the phenomenon of breach of contract infringement,and restricted license agreements occupy most of the market share;in the second stage of evolution,the enthusiasm of subsequent contributors is not high,and the economic benefit coefficient is the key factor affecting the strategic choice of initial contributors.The market share of restricted license agreements still occupies a slight advantage,and the inhibitory effect on loose license agreements is gradually weakened;in the third stage of evolution,with the increase of protection intensity and initial willingness of subsequent contributors,the speed of initial contributors choosing the loose licensing agreement strategy is obviously improved.At this time,the loose licensing agreement has stronger market competitiveness and faster diffusion rate.

关 键 词：数字开源社区 开源许可协议 违约侵权 演化博弈 LOTKA-VOLTERRA模型 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]