集体林地合作经营背景下动态博弈的稳定协调Solidarity值  

The Stable Coordinated Solidarity Value for Dynamic Games in the Context of Collective Forest Cooperative Management

作　　者：赵颖 林健[1,2] ZHAO Ying;LIN Jian(College of Computer and Information Sciences,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China;Center for Agroforestry Mega Data Science,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China)

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学计算机与信息学院,福建福州350002 [2]福建农林大学农林大数据研究中心,福建福州350002

出　　处：《福建师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2024年第5期30-40,94,共12页Journal of Fujian Normal University：Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(22BGL303)。

摘　　要：针对集体林地动态参与水平联盟合作中难以同时平衡稳定与公平的问题,建立一种概率犹豫模糊环境下的稳定协调分配策略。通过引入动态参与水平下概率犹豫模糊联盟的定义,构造具有调和概率犹豫模糊联盟的合作博弈及其广义Solidarity值,探讨其满足的平均零元性、有效性等重要性质。通过计算与广义Solidarity值距离最近的核心解,提出合作博弈的稳定协调分配策略,并将其应用于集体林地合作经营的收益分配。This paper addresses the challenge of balancing stability and fairness in the cooperative dynamics of participation-level coalitions in collective forest land.A stable and coordinated allocation strategy in a probabilistic hesitant fuzzy environment is established.The definitions of probabilistic hesitant fuzzy coalitions under dynamic participation levels are presented,and cooperative games with harmonized probabilistic hesitant fuzzy coalitions and their generalized Solidarity value are constructed.Desirable properties such as the A-null player and efficiency are explored.By calculating the core solution that is closest to the generalized Solidarity value,a stable and coordinated allocation strategy for cooperative games is proposed and applied to the income distribution of collective forest cooperative management.

关 键 词：合作博弈 广义Solidarity值 概率犹豫模糊联盟 动态参与水平 集体林地 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]