考虑供应链金融法律风险的现金补贴策略研究  

Research on Cash Subsidy Strategy Considering Legal Risks of Supply Chain Finance

作　　者：郝廷婷 孙凡松[2] HAO Tingting;SUN Fansong(Sichuan Tourism University,Institute for Ecological Rule of Law,Chengdu 610100,China;Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]四川旅游学院生态法治研究院,成都610100 [2]西南交通大学,成都610031

出　　处：《综合运输》2024年第8期126-131,共6页China Transportation Review

基　　金：四川省哲学社会科学重点研究基地、四川省教育厅人文社会科学重点研究基地、四川省电子商务与现代物流研究中心重点项目《ChatGPT工具下电子商务法治新问题研究》(DSWL23-4)。

摘　　要：本文基于Stackelberg博弈,考虑了新兴产业背景下的供应链金融法律风险,构建了基于政府差异化现金补贴的企业期望利润函数,分析了供应链金融法律风险对供应商和零售商决策行为和政府差异化补贴策略的动态影响,结果表明存在动态因子最优值使资金约束供应商的期望利润达到最大,同时存在政府的最佳补贴规模使全局得到最优;资金约束供应商和约束零售商由动机减少自有资金来侵蚀政府差异化现金补贴红利,造成政府差异化现金补贴的激励扭曲。政府在实际进行差异化现金补贴的情况下更应该会同相关金融机构细化评估供应链金融的法律风险和供应链企业隐藏自有资金的道德风险,在全局视角下实现政府补贴资金的最大效用化。Based on Stackelberg game,this paper considers the legal risk of supply chain finance under the background of emerging industries,and constructs the expected profit function of enterprises on the government's differentiated cash subsidy,and analyzes the impact of legal risk of supply chain finance on the decision-making behavior of suppliers and retailers and the government's differentiated subsidy strategy.The results show that there is an optimal value of dynamic factors to maximize the expected profit of capitalconstrained suppliers,and there is an optimal subsidy scale of the government to achieve the global optimal;capital-constrained suppliers and retailers have the incentive to reduce their own funds to erode the government subsidy dividends,resulting in the incentive distortion of government cash subsidies.In the actual case of differentiated cash subsidies,the government should work with the financial institutions to evaluate the legal risk of supply chain finance and the moral risk of supply chain enterprises hiding their own funds,and realize the maximum utility of government subsidies from the global perspective.

关 键 词：供应链金融法律风险 道德风险 现金补贴 全局视角 激励扭曲 

分 类 号：TP391.9[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]