信用保险下零售商主导型供应链融资模式研究:基于报童模型的分析  

Credit-insurance Covered Financing of the Retailer-dominated Supply Chain:A Newsvendor Model

作　　者：石晓军 邢佳騉[2] Shi Xiaojun;Xing Jiakun(China Finance Policy Center,Beijing 100872,China;School of Finance,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]中国财政金融政策研究中心,北京100872 [2]中国人民大学财政金融学院,北京100872

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第8期194-203,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(21AZD028);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71673281)。

摘　　要：随着逆全球化进程的加剧,供应链上的信用风险普遍上升,信用保险受到越来越多的重视。同时,随着平台经济的兴起,零售商主导成为供应链的新常态。本文在报童模型框架下研究了零售商作为领导者的斯塔克尔伯格博弈中信用保险的协调功能,扩展了市场需求不确定条件下商业信用的研究。通过对比供应链外银行融资和供应链内商业信用融资发现,带有信用保险的商业信用可以降低供应商批发价格,增加零售商订单量;能更好地协调供应链,使供应商和零售商利润均得到提升,达到斯塔克尔伯格均衡,但仍无法达到供应链协调均衡。满足极端情况下信用保险保障力度大于保费支出的条件时,处于供应链主导地位的零售商愿意共同分担保险费用,甚至承担全部保险费用。建议设计分担型定制信用保险以稳定供应链。The significance of credit insurance magnifies with the intensifying of de-globalization and the attendant instability of the supply chain.Meanwhile,the rise of the platform economy renders retailerdominated supply chains a new norm.In combination,the coordination role of insurance along a retailerdominated supply chain is explored with optional external bank credit or internal trade-credit financing.A model builds on a newsvendor Stackelberg game incorporating insurance participation between the supplier and the vendor,expanding the trade-credit literature under market demand uncertainty.The main results in this study indicate that the coordination role of credit insurance is evident in trade-credit financing internal to the supply chain while insignificant in bank credit which is mainly exogenous to the supply chain.Specifically,when the budget-constrained vendor is financed by trade credit,credit insurance can reduce the supplier's wholesale price and increase the retailer's order volume,better supply chain coordination,and improve profits for both suppliers and retailers.Resultantly,credit insurance can improve the supply chain's efficiency to the level of Stackelberg equilibrium but below the chain coordination equilibrium.When the credit insurance protection is greater than the premium expenditure in extremity,the in-dominance retailer is likely to share the insurance cost or even bears all the insurance costs.Regarding policy implications,our results suggest customized and costsharing credit insurance to stabilize the supply chain in the post-COVID-19 era.

关 键 词：商业信用 信用保险 零售商主导 报童模型 融资约束 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学] F842