乡村振兴背景下基于中央政府项目补贴分析的供应链金融决策研究  

Research on Supply Chain Financial Decision Based on the Analysis of Central Government Project Subsidy under the Background of Rural Revitalization Subsidy

作　　者：谢楠 何海涛 周艳菊[3] 王宗润[3] Xie Nan;He Haitao;Zhou Yanju;Wang Zongrun(School of Business,Hunan Normal University,Changsha 410081,China;Hunan Key Laboratory of Macroeconomic Big Data Mining and Its Application,School of Business,Hunan Normal University,Changsha 410081,China;School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南师范大学商学院,湖南长沙410081 [2]宏观经济大数据挖掘与应用湖南省重点实验室(湖南师范大学商学院),湖南长沙410081 [3]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第8期214-229,共16页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71901094);国家自然科学基金重大项目(72091515,71991463);湖南省自然科学基金青年项目(2020JJ5378)。

摘　　要：乡村振兴是实现共同富裕的必由之路。本文构建中央政府项目补贴相同条件下,乡镇企业、电商平台和地方政府间的四阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨了竞争性乡镇企业采取不同零售渠道和供应链融资方式对于乡村振兴战略的影响。研究发现,在存在消费者偏好的情况下,乡镇企业会选择网络零售的方式进行产品销售。中央政府项目补贴政策对乡村振兴产品销售量和产品乡村振兴度的提高以及抑制地方政府对乡镇企业的外部性影响均具有显著的正向影响。因此,虽然中央政府进行项目补贴在短期内“吃力不讨好”,但只要控制贷款利率在合理水平内,该措施仍是实施乡村振兴战略的重要举措,也是国家实现企业转型、产品创新、社会福利有效提高的长远之策。Rural revitalization is the only way to realize common prosperity.In recent years,the central government has taken a series of measures to implement the rural revitalization strategy.However,some local governments are trapped in the impulsive performance of political achievements,and there are still many short-term behaviors,which have hidden fiscal,financial and social risks.A four-stage Stackelberg game model among township enterprises,e-commerce platforms and local governments is constructed under the same conditions of central government project subsidies.It is found that the increasing the central government's project subsidy rate and consumer revitalization preference payment coefficient result in lower the external impact of local governments on township enterprises,thereby reducing the cost of township enterprises and promoting township and village enterprises produce rural revitalization products to achieve consumption upgrades and product upgrades.At the same time,it is found that the loan interest rates set by e-commerce platforms should be regulated.Because the e-commerce platform has the motivation to increase the loan interest rate to obtain additional income,which in turn forces the township and village enterprises to“recharge with inferior products”in the production of products,resulting in the failure of the central government's project subsidy transmission mechanism,and even negative effects.Overall,this study shows that the guiding mechanism of the central government's project subsidy on the external behavior of the local government,and its influence on the product production,channel sales and loan mode selection of township enterprises.Further evidence shows that the necessity of supervising the loan interest rate of e-commerce platforms from the perspective of supply chain finance.And it is concluded that the central government's project subsidy measures are still an important measure of the rural revitalization strategy,and a long-term strategy for the country to achieve enterprise trans

关 键 词：乡村振兴 供应链金融 中央政府补贴 地方政府竞争 STACKELBERG模型 

分 类 号：F830.3[经济管理—金融学] F812.2