分类监管政策与地方融资平台绩效——来自融资平台退出名单制管理系统的经验证据  

Classified Regulatory Policy and the Perform ance of Local Government Financing Platforms-Evidence from the Exit of Financing Platforms from List-based Management System

作　　者：方嘉宇 陆毅[1] FANG Jiayu;LU Yi(School of Economics and Management,Tsinghua University)

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《金融研究》2024年第4期75-93,共19页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(23CJY007)的资助。

摘　　要：本文基于融资平台退出(原)银监会名单制管理系统政策,采用交错型双重差分模型,识别分类监管政策对地方融资平台绩效的影响。研究发现:(1)分类监管政策有利于推动地方融资平台绩效提升,且这一影响主要集中在高市场化程度地区、负债率较高的平台、高信用等级平台以及经营性业务平台;(2)分类监管政策通过收入提升效应、成本管控效应和营运效率提升效应改善融资平台绩效;(3)退出名单制管理系统后,融资平台债务结构得到优化,长期债务比重上升,但长期偿债能力有所下降。本文结论对加强地方融资平台治理、促进融资平台分类转型具有参考意义。In order to categorize and transform local government financing platforms(LGFPs)and modernize China's financial governance,it is imperative to improve the performance of LGFPs.China has implemented a number of regulatory policies to standardize LGFPs'management and encourage the transformation of companies with stable operating income and cash flow.One important regulatory tool representing the classified regulatory policy is the China Banking Regulatory Commission's(CBRC)LGFP list-based management system.We employ the staggered difference-in-differences model to estimate the effect of CBRC's regulatory policy on the performance of LGFPs using manually collected data from 2010 to 2018,with the withdrawal from the list-based management system as a quasi-natural experiment.Additionally,we explore mechanisms through which classified regulatory policy influences the performance of LGFPs and the heterogeneous effects from the perspectives of regional marketization,debt ratio,credit rating,and business type of LGFPs.Our main findings are as follows.(1)Classified regulatory policy is conducive to promoting the performance of LGFPs.The aforementioned conclusion holds after a number of tests,including parallel trend tests,exclusion of samples from municipalities directly under the central government,exclusion of other policies,alternative estimation methods,and placebo tests.In terms of the calendar effect,this positive association becomes apparent primarily since 2015.(2)The classified regulatory policy significantly improves the performance of LGFPs located in more marketized provinces,as well as LGFPs with higher debt ratios,credit ratings,and operational business,but not conducive to improving the performance of LGFPs for public welfare activities.(3)The mechanism analysis demonstrates that the classified regulatory policy can promote the performance of LGFPs through revenue improvement,cost control and operating efficiency enhancement.(4)The extended analysis reveals that LFGPs have optimized the debt structure follo

关 键 词：分类监管政策 地方融资平台 名单制管理系统 交错型双重差分模型 

分 类 号：F832.39[经济管理—金融学] F272.5F832.0