随机抽查制度能抑制审计意见购买吗  

Does the Random Inspection Reduce Audit Opinion Shopping?

作　　者：张国清 陈思岑 张鹏东 林晓薇 Zhang Guoqing

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院会计学系/厦门大学会计发展研究中心,361005 [2]厦门国家会计学院,361005 [3]中山大学管理学院/中山大学现代会计与财务研究中心,510275 [4]福州外语外贸学院财会学院,350202

出　　处：《会计研究》2024年第5期182-192,共11页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72102242);国家社会科学基金(21BJY005);广东省基础与应用基础研究基金(2024A1515012276)的资助。

摘　　要：自2016年以来,证监会每年抽取两家会计师事务所,核查其在总分所一体化管理和审计质量内控体系上的问题。本文基于2016—2018年的随机抽查工作,研究这一审计监管新实践对审计意见购买行为的影响。研究发现:会计师事务所在被抽查后,配合客户进行审计意见购买的概率会降低。检验显示:一方面,抽查制度通过强化总分所一体化管理,在分所执业项目中表现出更显著的效果;另一方面,抽查制度要求落实审计质量内控职责,对于审计人员工作负荷大、内控把关相对宽松的事务所,抽查制度的抑制作用更明显。进一步研究表明:被抽查事务所若受到处罚,会加强这一效果;而在前十大事务所执业项目中,该影响被削弱。本文丰富了审计监管效果的经验证据,并从监管风险视角拓展了审计意见购买的动因研究。Since 2016,the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC)has randomly selected two accounting firms every year to inspect their works in integrated management of branches and internal quality control(the Random Inspection,RI).Using the staggered inspection work from 2016 to 2018,we construct a generalized DID model to investigate the effect of RI on audit opinion shopping,and find evidence supporting that RI reduces the possibility of accounting firms engaging in the opinion shopping.The effect is more pronounced for accounting firms punished after RI,and among the practice of non-big-10 accounting firms.Furthermore,we find stronger effects of RI among audit offices'practice and audit offices with limited CPAs,which are consistent with the contents of RI.We also provide evidence of increasing audit independence and audit quality.Overall,we enrich the empirical evidence of opinion shopping from the perspective of audit supervision.

关 键 词：随机抽查 审计意见购买 独立性 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]